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I. INTRODUCTION
Ever since the state of Hawaii' and now Vermone raised the possibility
* Director of Family Law Clinic and Assistant Professor of Clinical Law, Touro College, Jacob D.
Fuchsberg Law Center. I want to thank all the students who worked on this project, especially Kelly Caputo,
Esq., Paula Lopez, Esq., research assistant Craig DeMeo, the entire Spring 1999 roster of "Sexual Orientation
and Law" for much of the initial research and one of the most stimulating teaching experiences I have en-
joyed, Taya Williams, Jacob Meyer, CPA, Janis Noto, Esq., Peter Maiorino and Pasquale Sicuranza.
1 Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993), remanded sub nom. Baehr v. Miike, CIV. No. 91-1394,
1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996), rev'd, 994 P.2d 566 (Haw. 1999). Although the initial deci-
sion found an equal protection violation under the Hawaii Constitution, a subsequent amendment allowing the
Legislature to reserve marriage for opposite-sex couples rendered the case moot and the Hawaii Supreme
Court dismissed it on that ground, carefully declining to vacate its initial ruling.
2 Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999). For a more detailed discussion of this case, see infra
Part V. For the legislative responses of both Hawaii and Vermont to these judicial decisions, see infra Part
VI.
The appellant's (proponent's) brief to the Vermont Supreme Court is published as Mary Bonauto
et al., The Freedom to Marry for Same-Sex Couples: The Opening Appellate Brief of Plaintiffs Stan Baker et
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that two adults of the same gender could become married to each other, much has
been written regarding same-sex marriage3 and the justifications for it.4 These justi-
fications are usually based upon the expectations and legal rights of the two poten-
tial adult partners. Yet marriage, whether between a man and a woman or two
adults of the same gender, frequently involves more than just two adults. Marriage
frequently involves children who receive benefits therefrom.5 What is different
about a child of a marriage is that a child essentially has no choice as to the marital
status of the parents; that is a decision made by the adults and not the child. In all
the discussion about same-sex marriage and the rights of adults, as well as the
benefits they can derive therefrom, there is precious little written about the rights of
a child who may be the product of a same-sex relationship. 6 The preponderance of
the dialogue about same-sex marriage concentrates on the adult partners and their
derivative benefits from the relationship; precious little focus is given to the rights
of a child who may be a product of a same-sex relationship. The purpose of this
paper is to analyze the rights of a child whose parents may be unable to marry be-
cause of the restrictions on same-sex marriage and the resultant loss of benefits to
the child that would have been enjoyed if the option of marriage were available to
the parents.
Part II of this article will discuss the right of the government to regulate the
establishment of family and of the right to marry. Part III will discuss how a child
may be legally the product of a same-sex union, and the right of the child to enjoy
the benefits of a particular family. Part IV will discuss in detail the rights and bene-
fits of a child whose parents are married to each other. Part V will offer a detailed
analysis and discussion of the recent decision in Baker v. Vermont8, which offers
intriguing possibilities for the future of legalized same-sex relationships. Part VI
al. in Baker et al. v. State of Vermont, 5 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 409 (1999). The reply brief is published as
Mary Bonauto et al., The Freedom to Marry for Same-Sex Couples: The Reply Brief of Plaintiffs Stan Baker
et al. in Baker et al. v. State of Vermont, 6 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1 (1999).
3 Same-sex marriage can involve more than homosexual couples. Two adults, including relatives,
may seek to marry for a variety of reasons involving care, nurturing, and financial support and benefits.
Nevertheless, the primary focus of the debate regarding the legalization of same-sex marriage involves gay
male and lesbian couples, and this paper will highlight these specific couples in its analysis.
4 See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE (1996); Maura 1.
Strassberg, Distinctions of Form or Substance: Monogamy, Polygamy and Same-Sex Marriage, 75 N.C. L.
REv. 1501 (1997); Richard D. Mohr, Symposium on Sexual Orientation, The Case for Gay Marriage, 9
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 215 (1995); Mark Strasser, Domestic Relations Jurisprudence and
the Great, Slumbering Baehr: On Definitional Preclusion, Equal Protection and Fundamental Interests, 64
FORDHAM L. REV. 921 (1995).
5 Children living with their same-sex parents may not be able to receive benefits from both of their
parents as easily as other children might because of the state refusal to allow the same-sex couple to marry.
See Strasser, supra note 4, at 949.
6 Rights and benefits of the child are sometimes mentioned in passing.
7 The distinction should be made between children of parents who are legally permitted to marry but
choose not to do so, and children whose parents are not legally permitted to marry. This article deals only
with the latter category.
744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
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will discuss the benefits of domestic partnership and civil union legislation and
private agreements and how they fail to offer children adequate substitution for a
valid marriage between the parents.
II. REGULATING FAMILY AND MARRIAGE
A. Defining and Regulating Family
The family, historically, has been highly valued and viewed as a great
benefit'to a stable and productive society. Safeguarding the family and its values
shapes policy and politics.9
Although we consider the family sacrosanct, the fact is that governments at
different levels regulate not only the activities of the family, but the very composi-
tion of the family unit itself. The definition of family is used as a government func-
tion in granting or denying benefits to a certain group of people.10 There are, how-
ever, two different classes of definition of "families," and it is the difference in
these families for definitional purposes that raises serious questions about restric-
tions on same-sex marriage as viewed from a child of the union.11
Many of the noted cases involving the definition of family come from zon-
ing laws where local governments attempt to regulate the number of individuals
living within a certain space for health, safety and aesthetic reasons.12 What is
unique about these cases generally is that the parties are not married to each other
and there is no tie of blood or marriage bringing the people together. Government
therefore must look at the function of these people and determine whether they are,
in fact, a family unit, 13 the functional equivalent of a family,14 or within some other
level or relationship which the government will allow to live together in one dwell-
9 See Martha Albertson Fineman, Our Sacred Institution: The Ideal of the Family in American Law
and Society, 1993 UTAH L. REv. 387, 390-91 (1993). A perfect example is the debate regarding, and enact-
ment of, the Defense of Marriage Act in 1996. See Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at28
U.S.C. § 1738C (Supp. III 1997)).
10 See Hann v. Hous. Auth. of Easton, 709 F. Supp 605 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
11 "Not responsible for their birth, these children [of a lesbian family] are often punished by the legal
system for society's failure to recognize the legitimacy of the relationship between their parents. Such dis-
crimination seems to contravene the standards set forth in the Equal Protection Clause." Julia Frost Davies,
Note, Two Mons and a Baby: Protecting the Nontraditional Family Through Second Parent Adoptions, 29
NEW ENG. L. REv. 1055, 1077 (1995).
12 See, e.g., Village of Belle Terre v. Borass, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
13 See, e.g., Penobscot Area Hous. Dev. Corp. v. City of Brewer, 434 A.2d 14 (Me. 1981), where the
ordinance required non-blood-related individuals to establish a "domestic bond." The Supreme Judicial Court
of Maine ruled that this group home for the mentally retarded did not include a central authority figure and
failed to meet the statutory definition of family.
14 See, e.g., Borough of Glassboro v. Vallorosi, 568 A.2d. 888 (N.J. 1990), where the New Jersey
Supreme Court held that a group of 10 college students sharing a large, single-family house qualified as the
"functional equivalency [sic]" of a family and satisfied the ordinance, even though the intent of the residents
to remain part of this group was inherently temporary.
1999]
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ing.15
The second area where the government may define family is in granting
benefits. Housing rights, 16 tax laws, 17 even vacancy decontrol of rental units,"' are
areas in which government has extended or denied benefits to certain groups of
individuals based on the definition of family.19
The above examples, as stated, all contain instances where the adults are
neither married to each other nor related by blood, marriage or consanguinity.2"
Courts have been generous in allowing governments to enhance or restrict the defi-
nition of family because courts have held that this type of definition is in fact not
creating a new family, but simply defining, for a particular purpose, the equivalent
of a family.21 Of course, this assumes that family is defined by the presence of the
adult(s), but in today's ever-changing society perhaps we should reconsider that the
family may, just as easily, be defined around the child.22
Where government may not tread so easily, however, is when government
seeks to restrict relations among individuals who are actually related by blood or
marriage. In Moore v. City of East Cleveland,23 the Supreme Court held that a gov-
15 These cases are frequently used in family law courses to assist students to understand that the term
"family" is not fixed in definition or structure, but is amorphous in its content and concept. Zoning ordinances
are frequently adopted to assign certain quality of life standards to a particular community or neighborhood,
but each definition of who may reside in a particular locale becomes, by its nature, exclusive as well, keeping
out individuals because of their excessive number, use of the premises, etc.
16 See, e.g., Hann v. Hous. Auth. of Easton, 709 F. Supp. 605, 609 n.6 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
17 See infra Part IV.A.
18 See Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989), where the court held that an objec-
tive examination of the relationship of the parties was necessary to determine if they met the definition of
family as contained in a local regulation (actually enacted by the State of New York, but applying in this
instance to New York City).
19 Even here, however, certain rights and benefits which we normally associate with families are
restricted to those units in which the parents are married. The relationship between kinship and marriage was
questioned by Bruce C. Hafen in The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship and Sexual Privacy-
Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81 MICH. L. REv. 463 (1983). Professor Hafen argued that a
distinction must remain between marriage and kinship, on the one hand, and the evolving concepts of indi-
vidual tradition and self-interest. But he failed to accept the fact that children have always existed as a result
of non-marital unions, will continue to exist, and legal discrimination against the parents because of marital
status is, in effect, legal discrimination against the child.
20 "The instant a court is willing to say that 'family' does not mean 'married,' the path is open to
gays and lesbians to have their relationships recognized too." Thomas S. Hixson, Public and Private Recogni-
tion of the Families of Lesbians and Gay Men, 5 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 501, 502 (1997). The legal recogni-
tion of gay families depends on the separation of legal benefits from marital status. See id. at 504.
21 Of course, in defining "equivalency" governments may have more leeway to avoid constitutional
limitations than if the government is attempting to redefine an actual "family."
22 See, e.g., Jesse Green, Orbiting the Son, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1999, § 6 (Magazine), at 66. The
family here includes the (gay) father, his adopted son, various "aunts" and "uncles," and many other "shadow
families." "In traditional families we easily see how the pre-existing structure incorporates the child, but in a
family as unusual, as manufactured as this one, the opposite process is also evident. The child creates a struc-
ture to suit him." Id. The author calls these new social structures "radial," centering on the child.
23 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
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emnment may not tear at the very basis of family itself. In that case, the government
tried to redefine a family by drawing classes among people with the same blood
relations to each other, and this was held impermissible.24 In discussing the attempt
to regulate an extended family the Court stated:
Ours is by no means a tradition limited to respect for the bonds
uniting the members of the nuclear family. The tradition of uncles,
aunts, cousins, and especially grandparents sharing a household
along with parents and children has roots equally venerable and
equally deserving of constitutional recognition.... Even if condi-
tions of modem society have brought about a decline in extended
family households, they have not erased the accumulated wisdom
of civilization, gained over the centuries and honored throughout
our history, that supports a larger conception of the family....
... [T]he Constitution prevents East Cleveland from standardizing
its children and its adults by forcing all to live in certain narrowly
defined family patterns.25
In other circumstances the government is also equally restrictive of regula-
tion involving blood or marital relationships. A government will not normally inter-
fere with the way parents raise their children so long as the parents are providing
minimally adequate care to the children26 and are accepting society's fundamental
premise that all children must have basic standards of care; however, the level be-
yond that is the right of the parent and not of the government.
In Meyer v. Nebraska,27 the Supreme Court established the importance of
family in our society. In striking down a law which prohibited instruction in foreign
languages before the eighth grade, the Court found a liberty interest in the "right of
the individual to ... marry, establish a home and bring up children .... The estab-
lished doctrine is that this liberty may not be interfered with, under the guise of
protecting the public interest, by legislative action which is arbitrary or without
reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the state to effect., 2
8
24 The Court held: "Our decisions establish that the Constitution protects the sanctity of the family
precisely because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition. It is
through the family that we inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished values, moral and cultural."
Id. at 503-04.
25 Id. at 504-06.
26 See, e.g., N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 371(4-a) (McKinney 2000), which states:
"Neglected child" means a child less than eighteen years of age ...whose physical,
mental or emotional condition has been impaired.., as a result of the failure of his par-
ent or other person legally responsible for his care to exercise a minimum degree of care
... in supplying the child with adequate food, clothing, shelter [or] education ....
27 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
28 Id. at 399-400.
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Just a few years later, the Court struck down an Oregon law which restricted educa-
tion to secular schools. In Pierce v. Society of Sisters,29 the Court pronounced:
Under the doctrine of Meyer v. Nebraska ... we think it entirely
plain that the Act of 1922 unreasonably interferes with the liberty
of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of
children under their control. As often heretofore pointed out,
rights guaranteed by the Constitution may not be abridged by leg-
islation which has no reasonable relation to some purpose within
the competency of the State. The fundamental theory of liberty
upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any
general power of the State to standardize its children by forcing
them to accept instruction from public teachers only. The child is
not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and di-
rect his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to rec-
ognize and prepare him for additional obligations.3"
The next major decision by the Supreme Court to discuss the importance
of family resulted in a rare victory for the state. Still, in Prince v. Massachusetts,
31
the Court emphasized the role of the family, deciding that this was one of those rare
instances where the state's interest in protecting a child's welfare outweighed the
parent's right to decide the child's well-being. "It is cardinal with us that the cus-
tody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary func-
tion and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply
nor hinder. And it is in recognition of this that these decisions have respected the
private realm of family life which the state cannot enter.',
32
Perhaps the most overwhelming affirmation of family integrity can be
found in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 3 where the Court affirmed the right of the Amish to
control their own level of education over the state's compulsory education laws.
Attempting to distinguish Prince v. Massachusetts on the record (no inference of
harm to the physical or mental health of the child or to the public safety, peace,
order or welfare), the Court held that the Amish right to raise their children to be
29 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
30 Id. at 535 (citations omitted).
31 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
32 Id. at 166 (citations omitted). Curiously, this case did not deal with a parent but an aunt-guardian,
and was, ostensibly, a child labor case. It also involved religious freedom and Jehovah's Witnesses, a group
which has been as unsuccessful in the Supreme Court as homosexuals. The Court went on to state: "But the
family itself is not beyond regulation in the public interest, as against a claim of religious liberty. And neither
the rights of religion nor rights of parenthood are beyond limitation. Acting to guard the general interest in
youth's well being, the state as parens patriae may restrict the parent's control by requiring school attendance,
regulating or prohibiting the child's labor and in many other ways ... the state has a wide range of power for
limiting parental freedom and authority in things affecting the child's welfare; and that this includes, to some
extent, matters of conscience and religious conviction." Id. (citations omitted).
33 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
[Vol. 102:411
6
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 102, Iss. 2 [1999], Art. 7
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol102/iss2/7
SUFFER THE LITLE CHILDREN
Amish - that is, to continue their special way of life and to train their children
vocationally, rather than through formal compulsory education - outweighed the
state's requirement of formal high school education until age sixteen.34
The Supreme Court has been more than salutary about the importance of
family to both the individual and society. 5 The Court has said that "[t]he intangible
fibers that connect parent and child have an infinite variety. They are woven
throughout the fabric of our society, providing it with strength, beauty and flexibil-
ity."'  Individual interests in matters concerning family life are as compelling and
"among the basic civil rights of man."37 Parental interests in maintaining relation-
ships with their children are fundamental liberty interests for due process pur-
poses,38 and parental decision-making on behalf of children is protected from un-
warranted state interference.39
The Court also has recognized the right of companionship, although only
of the parents' right to companionship of their children.4" The Court has not yet
found a similar right on behalf of children to companionship of their parents,
whether blood, legal or de facto.41
What is the basis for this difference? It stems in part from our notion and
our complete acceptance as a society that people who are related by blood or con-
sanguinity are a family.42 Where we stretch in other circumstances to properly and
fully define the term,43 there is a perceived reticence to do so where these alternate
families do not meet our portrait of the stereotype: husband, wife, children.44 The
34 See id. Interestingly, Justice Douglas, in a dissent, raised the concern that no one had sought the
input of two of the children who were the subjects of the proceeding and it might not be appropriate to as-
sume that a child's wishes were the same as the parent. "While the parents, absent dissent, normally speak for
the entire family, the education of the child is a matter on which the child will often have decided views....
It is the student's judgment, not the parents' that is essential if we are to give full meaning to what we have
said about the Bill of Rights and of the right of students to be masters of their own destiny." Id. at 244-45
(Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
35 See Lydia A. Nayo, On Sexual Minority, Adoption from the Perspective of the Unadopted Child,
35 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 25, 87 (1996-97).
36 Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 256 (1983).
37 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 315 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
38 See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
39 See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
40 See Santosky, 455 U.S. 745; Stanley, 405 U.S. 645.
See infra Part Ill.B, especially text accompanying note 128.
42 See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
43 It is difficult to define "family" because traditional notions in our society tend to dictate that a
married man and woman and their children constitute a "family." However, see Leo Sullivan, Comment,
Same Sex Marriage and the Constitution, 6 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 275, 282 (1973), where the author notes that
there is no "typical" American family. Many families now consist of non-traditional arrangements, including
single-parent families formed due to divorce and single motherhood, stepfamilies, grandparent-grandchild
units, senior citizen group homes, pseudo-parent-child and homosexual family units.
44 I like to call this the "Donna Reed" or "Father Knows Best" type of family, glorified by 1950s
1999]
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marriage-centered nuclear family has traditionally served as the bastion for secur-
ing American family values, but we must reconsider whether legitimate values of
families headed by same-sex couples can be protected by means other than mar-
riage.45 While attempts are made to include others into a broader definition of fam-
ily or family unit, no attempt has been made to exclude those whom society recog-
nizes as the basic core family unit.
This is because we recognize family as a result of blood relationships
46
rather than function.47 Two individuals may perform all tasks and equal, in every
sense of the word, all the functions of a parent and child. Yet if they are not related
by blood (or at least adoption) they will not be considered a parent and child in the
eyes of the law. 48 The role of law should be to respect the caregiver's commitment,
hard work, and knowledge and understanding of the child by according him or her
maximum autonomy, authority and assistance, not to create impediments to the
family relationship.49
B. Regulating Marriage
The same policies regarding governmental regulation of families are, to a
lesser extent, similarly applicable to marriage. Marriage is normally regulated by
the state government.50 While the state may certainly prescribe the requirements for
sitcoms. Inevitably there was a husband who was employed, a wife who was a homemaker, and two or three
children. The television shows were fictional, and the "family" they glorified was probably more of an ideal
than a reality.
45 See Craig W. Christensen, If Not Marriage? On Securing Gay and Lesbian Family Values by a
"Simulacrum of Marriage," 66 FoRDHAM L. REV. 1699, 1712 (1998). Professor Christensen goes on to
analyze the evolution of the nuclear family, finding that it did not evolve in a form recognizable to us today
until well after the end of the Middle Ages and did not become the dominant family model until nineteenth
century America. See id. at 1713-16.
46 See Mary Patricia Treuthart, Adopting a More Realistic Definition of "Family, "26 GONZ. L. REv.
91, 97 (1990-91). Some Americans make a distinction between "family" and "relatives" by focusing on
emotional ties for the former and blood for the latter. See id.
47 Paula Ettelbrick argues for broader family definition and the right to family benefits that are not
contingent on marriage or blood. See Paula L. Ettelbrick, Wedlock Alert: A Comment on Lesbian and Gay
Family Recognition, 5 J.L. & POL'Y 107, 113 (1996). She argues "for more inclusive social and legal policies
that would bestow respect and benefits upon all who assume the responsibility for and function of family-
whether they are married or not." Id. at 114. If we treat the sexual orientation of those involved as a matter of
little or no consequence, we emphasize an approach to family definition of function over form, which has
other precedents in family law analysis. See Craig W. Christensen, Legal Ordering of Family Values: The
Case of Gay and Lesbian Families, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1299, 1324 (1997).
48 See Ettelbrick, supra note 47, at 122.
49 See Karen Czapanskiy, Interdependencies, Families, and Children, 39 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 957
(1999).
50 Of course, the federal government jumped head first into the regulation of marriage with enact-
ment of the Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738C (Supp. III 1997). While the first section of the statute attempts to redefine the full faith and credit
clause of the Constitution for the benefit of the states that may not wish to grant legal recognition to same-sex
marriages contracted in other states, the second section of the act defines a legal marriage for the purposes of
determining entitlement for various federal benefits. See id. This Act appears to be the first federal interfer-
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obtaining a license to effectuate the marriage ceremony, marriage has been defined
as a fundamental right, and the state may not generally prohibit two individuals
from becoming married to each other, with only a few exceptions.51 These excep-
tions include marriages that may be incestuous or polygamous52 in nature and, at
least until now, marriages between two adults of the same gender.5 Recent at-
tempts to regulate the establishment of the marital unit itself have generally met
with judicial opposition. The Supreme Court said in Loving v. Virginia:
The freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital
personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free
men.
Marriage is one of the "basic civil rights of man," fundamental to
our very existence and survival .... Under our Constitution the
freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of another race resides
ence in the states' power to regulate marriage. See Courtney G. Joslin, Note, Equal Protection andAnti-Gay
Legislation: Dismantling the Legacy of Bowers v. Hardwick-Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996), 32
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV 225,245 (1997).
51 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) ("To deny this fundamental freedom on so unsup-
ported a basis as the racial classifications embodied in these statutes... is surely to deprive all the State's
citizens of liberty without due process of law."); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) ("We are
dealing here with legislation which involves one of the basic civil rights of man. Marriage and procreation are
fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race.").
52 See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). The Court stated that:
Marriage, while from its very nature a sacred obligation, is neverfheless, in most civi-
lized nations, a civil contract, and usually regulated by law. Upon it society may be said
to be built, and out of its fruits spring social relations and social obligations and duties,
with which government is necessarily required to deal.
Id. at 165.
53 "Just why homosexuality, incest, and polygamy are all lumped together-aside from the fact that
they are all departures from traditional marriage-is unclear. Perhaps because they all depart from tradition?"
Stephen Macedo, Homosexuality and the Conservative Mind, 84 GEo. L.J. 261,288 (1995).
The health and consent rationales that justify regulation or prohibition of [incestuous,
underage or polygamous] marriages are inapplicable to same-sex marriages. States pro-
hibit consanguineous marriages because such unions threaten the biological health of the
family and sexualize what should be a nonsexual relationship. Same-sex marriages,
however, neither increase the chance of genetic deterioration, nor undermine the state's
interest in desexualizing family relationships. . . . Moreover, although states prohibit
underage marriages because the parties are not old enough to give meaningful consent..
. the parties who enter same-sex relationships are adults whose consent is presumed to
be meaningful. Finally, states prohibit polygamous marriages, in large part, because leg-
islators believe that such marriages undermine the stability of family relationships.
[Reynolds v. United States]. More specifically, the multiplicity of parties in polygamous
marriages raises concerns about knowledge and consent, support, and inheritance. Same-
sex adult couples involve no more parties, and therefore no more concerns, than do non-
polygamous heterosexual marriages.
Note, In Sickness and in Health, in Hawaii and Where Else?: Conflict of Laws and Recognition of Same-Sex
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with the individual and cannot be infringed by the State.54
In striking down Virginia's anti-miscegenation statute, the Court granted
the right to marry status as a fundamental right, thereby compelling strict scrutiny
of any statute inhibiting this right.
Although Loving arose in the context of racial discrimination, prior and
subsequent decisions of the Court confirm that the right to marry is of fundamental
importance to all individuals.
Building on the foundation set in Loving, the Court reviewed the parame-
ters of this fundamental right in Zablocki v. Redhail.55
[T]he right to marry is of fundamental importance for all individu-
als. Long ago, in Maynard v. Hill, the Court characterized mar-
riage as "the most important relation in life," and as "the founda-
tion of the family and of society, without which there would be
neither civilization nor progress[.]"...
More recent decisions have established that the right to marry is
part of the fundamental "right of privacy" implicit in the Four-
teenth Amendment's Due Process Clause....
... [T]he decision to marry has been placed on the same level of
importance as decisions relating to procreation, childbirth, child
rearing, and family relationships.... [I]t would make little sense
to recognize a right of privacy with respect to other matters of
family life and not with respect to the decision to enter that rela-
tionship that is the foundation of the family in our society....
. . . [R]easonable regulations that do not significantly interfere
with decisions to enter into the marital relationship may legiti-
mately be imposed.-"
54 Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
55 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
56 Id. at 384, 386 (citations omitted). Despite labeling marriage "fundamental," the Court was less
clear on the standard of review. Although one might believe that a fundamental right would trigger a "strict
scrutiny" or "compelling state interest" analysis, Justice Marshall used the term "critical examination," per-
haps a mid-level standard reserved for some of the Court's decisions examining gender-based classifications.
It can even be argued that the statute in question failed under a rational basis review and that the discussion in
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Again, however, we are talking about the traditional marriage between an
adult male and an adult female.5 7 Attempts to redefine the composition of the mari-
tal unit have not been successful,' although many of the arguments against allow-
ing the establishment of these types of marriages go to the actual function of the
marital couple and the marital unit, rather than its establishment.59 Perhaps our
difficulty stems from the fact that we have no clear consensus on the definition of
marriage beyond its simple definition of a civil contract. 0 One of the most stunning
definitions of marriage is found in Griswold v. Connecticut:
61
Marriage is the coming together for better or worse, hopefully en-
during, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an associa-
tion that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living,
not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social
projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any in-
the Court's opinion and the various concurring and dissenting opinions merely cloud the issue.
A subsequent case did not clarify the issue. In Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987), the Court
struck down a Missouri regulation limiting the right to marry of state prison inmates. This decision unques-
tionably utilizes a simple rational basis analysis, thereby never having to clarify the standard of review left
open in Zablocki v. Redhail.
57 Professor Eskridge argues that marriage itself is a social construct He argues that:
[M]arriage is not a naturally generated institution with certain essential elements. In-
stead, it is a construction that is linked with other cultural and social institutions, so that
the old-fashioned boundaries between the public and private life melt away. Second, the
social construction of institutions like marriage is not and cannot be neutral, for it in-
volves the playing out of a society's power relationships.... Third, the social construc-
tion of marriage is dynamic. Linked as it is to other institutions and attitudes, marriage
will change as they change.
William N. Eskridge, Jr., A History of Same-Sex Marriage, 79 VA. L. REV. 1419, 1434 (1993). See also
Linda S. Eckols, The Marriage Mirage: The Personal and Social Identity Implications of Same-Gender
Matrimony, 5 MICH. J. GENDER& L. 353 (1999).
58 "Marriage can ... be described as a 'legal institution that defines and creates social relations. The
law creates the status of husband and wife; it is not a reflection of or response to spousal relations that exist
independently of law.' This definition of marriage is functional: it defines the relationship according to what
promotes familial and societal stability." In Sickness and in Health, supra note 53, at 2045. See also RICHARD
D. MOHR, A MORE PERFECT UNION - WHY STRAIGHT AMERICA MUST STAND UP FOR GAY RIGHTS 40
(1994).
59 See supra note 1. Some of the alleged benefits to society of heterosexual marriages include: "(1)
safe sexual relations, (2) procreation and childrearing, (3) the status of women, (4) the stability, strength, and
security of the family union, (5) the integrity of the basic unit of society, (6) civic virtue and public morality,
(7) interjurisdictional comity, and (8) government efficiency." Lynn D. Wardle, Legal Claims for Same-Sex
Marriage: Efforts to Legitimate a Retreat from Marriage by Redefining Marriage, 39 S. TEx. L. REV. 735,
754 (1998).
60 "Marriage, so far as its vtlidity in law is concemed, continues to be a civil contract, to which the
consent of the parties capable in law of making a contract is essential." N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 10 (McKin-
ney 1999). There is no reference in the quoted section, nor in the sections defining void and voidable mar-
riages, to the gender of the participants. This is only inferred by other references to "husband," "wife,"
"bride" and "groom" in the various sections detailing solemnization and the issuance of the marriage license.
61 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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volved in our prior decisions.62
If marriage is an intimate association based on substantive due process, equal pro-
tection and First Amendment rights, denial of marriage to same-sex couples raises
the level of review to a standard that few arguments can sustain.63
This is not to say that the state does not derive benefits from marriage.
"Marriage advances the state's interest in developing intimate and stable relation-
ships which in turn build 'social stability' and act as an emotional and economic
support system as well as a forum for physical intimacy.'
For example, it can be argued that a primary purpose of marriage is to cre-
ate children. Yet, no state requires a fertility test prior to marriage, and in fact, in
our society it is not uncommon for elderly people, well past the age of childbearing,
to create new marital units.65 Further, many of the rights and obligations of mar-
riage exist independently of the presence or absence of children.6 What we are
seeking then is to determine the right of government to make these choices and
67restrictions. The challenge is not to prove to lawmakers the special benefits of
marriage; the challenge is to convince lawmakers that nineteenth century models of
marriage and family simply no longer serve a large percentage of the population,
and that they must tailor benefits and privileges to twenty-first century concepts of
the functional family. If we define, first family and then marriage, by their func-
62 Id. at 486.
63 See Christensen, supra note 45, at 1702-03.
64 Anthony Dominic D'Amato, Note, Conflict of Laws Rules and the Interstate Recognition of Same-
Sex Marriages, 1995 U. ILL. L. REv. 911, 928 (1995). See also Note, Family, Marriage, and the Same-Sex
Couple, 12 CARDOZO L. REv. 681, 699 (1990).
65
The relationship between marriage and procreation, however, has grown tenuous, and
therefore procreation does not provide a compelling state interest [for prohibiting same-
sex marriage] .... [Tihere are many heterosexual couples who cannot or choose not to
bear children but still want to get married. States do not deny them the right to marry.
The idea that the survival of the race is a compelling state interest that is in jeopardy is
simply ludicrous. This country is no longer in danger of becoming underpopulated.
Christine Jax, Same-Sex Marriage-Why Not?, 4 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 461,468 (1995).
6 See MOHR, supra note 58, at 39 ("While mutual material support might be viewed as guarding the
interests of children, other marital rights, such as the immunity against compelled testimony from a spouse,
can hardly be grounded in child-related purposes.").
67 Professor Wardle states that:
Heterosexual marriages have been given special legal preference because they make
uniquely valuable contributions to the state, to society, and to individuals. Heterosexual
marriages have been singled out from all kinds of adult relationships for preferred status
because they are so important and valuable to society and'to the stability and continuity
of the state, and to achieving the purposes for which the state exists. The challenge is to
prove it to lawmakers and to the public generally-to show that this is still true on the
threshold of the twenty-first century.
Wardle, supra note 59, at 754. Professor Wardle fails to acknowledge, however, that this model of marriage is
rapidly losing favor even among heterosexual couples who, increasingly, divorce at unprecedented rates or
simply ignore the benefits of marriage and raise children without "benefit of clergy."
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tions68 and allow certain people into the definition, but exclude others who perform
the same function, then we are creating separate classes and raising the question of
constitutional discrimination.69 Even more so must we consider this discrimination
when it involves a child who has no control over his or her existence in a particular
family unit, nor over whether the parents are married.r
Simply put, marriage is a fundamental right that confers on those in a le-
gally recognized marriage certain benefits. r If the state is going to deny these
benefits to any individual by denying the right to marry, a compelling reason must
be established for doing so.72 Of more concern is that the prohibition on same-sex
marriage may actually run counter to compelling state interests such as public
health, family preservation and family stability.7 3 Professor Eskridge argues that the
legal incidents, benefits and obligations of marriage involve rules protecting pri-
vacy of the relationship, allowing a single economic unit and creating obligations
of support and fidelity, all of which will benefit same-sex couples and their chil-
dren as well as heterosexual couples. 74
68
Using a functional approach to defining marriage and family is consistent with the pol-
icy of encouraging the stabilizing of social values that marriage and family serve. While
the current 'bright-line' rule which uses marriage or blood relationship as its benchmark
has the advantage of clarity in its application, the ease with which persons of opposite
sexes can marry and subsequently divorce in most jurisdictions, adds to the conclusion
that mere participation in a formal marriage ceremony does not necessarily indicate
commitment to traditional family values. Neither permanence, procreation, economic in-
terdependence nor even sexual exclusivity is currently required for a valid marriage. In-
deed, marriage partners could reside separate and apart from one another without shar-
ing any aspects of their lives and still reap all the legal benefits of marriage unless their
coupling could be deemed a sham. Defining a family as a community of persons per-
forming the functions of a family would seem to do more to promote the underlying val-
ues on which the policy favoring marriage is based. Indeed, an obvious difficulty with
the concept of defining family by its functions is the dilemma of imposing higher stan-
dards on non-marriage-based families than those imposed on married couples.
Treuthart, supra note 46, at 97-98.
69 The issue is also raised that the failure of the state to sanction certain types of marriages causes
those individuals adversely affected to view the state as indifferent or actively hostile to their happiness;
consequently they do not experience the state as essential to the possibility of their individual existence and
happiness. This causes a lessening of loyalty to the state, or internalization of this hostility as self-hatred. See
Strassberg, supra note 4, at 1619-20.
70 See Ettelbrick, supra note 47, at 139.
71 A 1997 compilation by the United States General Accounting Office identified at least 1,049
federal laws classified with marital status as a factor and, presumably, denied to same-sex couples as a result
of the Defense of Marriage Act. See 1997 WL 67783 (F.D.C.H.). For a listing of specific rights and responsi-
bilities of marriage in New York, see Same-Sex Marriage in New York, 52 REC. OF Assoc. OF BAR OF CITY
OF N.Y. 343 (April 1997). For a similar listing in the District of Columbia, see ESKRIDGE, supra note 4, at 66.
Both lists, while sweeping and comprehensive, specifically detail the marital benefits of being a "spouse";
regretfully, neither extends the benefits analysis to being a "parent" or "child."
72 See Jax, supra note 65, at 463-64.
73 See id. at 471; see also Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1 (1992) (where a special tax benefit was
granted to intra-family property transfers).
74 See ESKRIDGE, supra note 4, at 116-17.
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III. THE CHILD IN A SAME-SEX ADULT HOUSEHOLD
A. How a Child Becomes a Member of a Same-Sex Family
Although there can be numerous ways for a child to become part of a fam-
ily involving same-sex adult partners, three primary methods will be discussed. The
first method, perhaps, seems the most obvious: the child is the biological child of
one of the adults, who is not presently involved in an intimate relationship and co-
habiting with the child's other parent. This means, technically, that the child's par-
ent is free to legally marry his or her partner. The gender status of the adult is rela-
tively unimportant in this scenario because of the overwhelming numbers of chil-
dren who are the product of divorce or of parents who have never married. Of
course, many of these adults and children wind up becoming stepparent and step-
child. It is no different in same-sex adult couples, because one or both of the part-
ners may have had a child from a previous marriage or heterosexual relationship
and may now wish to marry another adult, albeit of the same gender. At this point
this child is placed in the same situation as would be a child of opposite-gender
adults.
The second method in which a child may be the product of a same-sex
adult union is by adoption. While many states prohibit the practice of same-sex
couples adopting minor children, some allow it. Where adoption is permitted, the
anomaly is created that, while the child may be the legal child of both adults, these
adults may not legally marry and receive marital benefits for their family unit.
Included in contemporary non-traditional families are same-sex couples in
long-term relationships where one partner serves as the second parent to the other
partner's biological child without benefit of adoption. These couples often embrace
the same traditional concept of family values as heterosexual couples, such as pro-
viding support, loyalty, welfare, love and affection.75 Even though marriage be-
tween same-sex couples is not recognized in this country, the non-biological parent
may in fact serve as the psychological parent to the child. This parent in fact, how-
ever, is not afforded the legal benefits of the marital status and is not recognized as
a legal parent of the child.
Same-sex couples are pursuing legal recognition of the relationship be-
tween the second parent and the child in order to provide emotional and legal secu-
rity, without terminating the biological parent's legal rights through second-parent
adoptions.7 Courts are being called upon to reexamine the role of biological ties
and other legal relationships in the family against the backdrop of new technologies
and changing lifestyles.77 Some courts have accepted, and some have resisted, the
changing definition of "family" in contemporary society, reflecting the tension
75 See Sheryl L. Sultan, The Right of Homosexuals to Adopt: Changing Legal Interpretations of
-Parent" and "Family," 10 J. SUFFOLK ACAD. L. 45, 46 (1995).
76 See Charlotte J. Patterson, Adoption of Minor Children by Lesbian and Gay Adults: A Social
Science Perspective, 2 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 191, 195 (1995).
77 See Stewart G. Pollack, The Art of Judging, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 591, 609 (1996).
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between notions of traditional family and a more functional definition which rec-
ognizes the changing social permutation and the changing lifestyles of many
Americans.
r
Because adoption proceedings are often sealed, it is difficult to determine
how often these second-parent adoptions occur. It is highly likely that second-
parent adoptions have occurred quietly in many states, with little notice or record. 9
When decisions are made at the trial court level, these cases are unreported and
often do not have precedential value; therefore, within a state, decisions can vary
from court to court. Couples often must resort to forum shopping, hoping to be
placed on the calendar of a sympathetic judge.80
In some states there have been positive advances for same-sex couples.
The highest courts of Vermont,81 Massachusetts82 and New York have allowed
78 See id. at 608.
See Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., Adoption by Lesbians and Gay Men, An
Overview of the Law in the 50 States (visited Mar. 9, 1999) <http//www.lambdalegal.org> at 3 nA (copyright
1997).
80 See id at3.
81 Adoptions of B.L.V.B. and E.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271 (Vt. 1993). The court stated:
[O]ur paramount concern should be with the effect of our laws on the reality of chil-
dren's lives. It is not the courts that have engendered the diverse composition of today's
families. It is the advancement of reproductive technologies and society's recognition of
alternative lifestyles that have produced families in which a biological, and therefore a
legal, connection is no longer the sole organizing principle. But it is the courts that are
required to define, declare and protect the rights of children raised in these families,
usually upon their dissolution. At that point, courts are left to vindicate the public inter-
est in the children's financial support and emotional well-being by developing theories
of parenthood, so that "legal strangers" who are de facto parents may be awarded cus-
tody or visitation or be reached for support.
Id. at 1276.
82 In re Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1993). The Supreme Judicial Court noted that adoption into
"non-standard" families was neither recent nor uncommon and the legislature's permitting adoption by un-
married persons clearly sanctioned and acknowledged these special types of families. See id. at 319 nA.
83 In re Jacob and In re Dana, 660 N.E.2d 397, (N.Y. 1995). In this case, the Court of Appeals util-
ized the same rationale to approve two adoptions: one by a lesbian couple and one by an unmarried hetero-
sexual couple.
[I]n strictly construing the adoption statute, our primary loyalty must be to the statute's
legislative purpose - the child's best interest. ...
This policy would certainly be advanced in situations like those presented here by al-
lowing the two adults who actually function as a child's parents to become the child's
legal parents. The advantages which would result from such an adoption include Social
Security and life insurance benefits in the event of a parent's death or disability, the
right to sue for the wrongful death of a parent, the right to inherit under rules of intes-
tacy (see In re Tammy) and eligibility for coverage under both parents' health insurance
policies. In addition, granting a second parent adoption further ensures that two adults
are legally entitled to make medical decisions for the child in case of emergency and are
under a legal obligation for the child's economic support.
Even more important, however, is the emotional security of knowing that in the event
of a biological parent's death or disability, the other parent will have presumptive cus-
tody, and the children's relationship with their parents, siblings and other relatives will
continue should the coparents separate. Indeed, viewed from the children's perspective,
permitting the adoptions allows the children to achieve a measure of permanency with
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same-sex people to adopt their partners' children. Mid-level courts in the District of
Columbia,8 New Jersey85 and Illinois86 have also allowed same-sex, second-parent
adoptions, and these cases have not been appealed, setting at least some precedent.
Additionally, New Jersey has recently allowed two men to jointly adopt their foster
child.87
The highest courts of Connecticut88 and Wisconsin, 89 however, have de-
nied same-sex, second-parent adoptions, as have mid-level courts in Colorado9° and
Ohio.9' In addition, while the legislature in Florida expressly prohibits adoption by
homosexuals, New Hampshire recently repealed a similar statutory ban.93 How-
ever, state agencies have recently enacted regulations in Utah which ban gays from
both parent figures and avoids [a] disruptive visitation battle.
Id. at 399 (citation omitted).
84 See In re M.M.D. & B.H.M., 662 A.2d 837 (D.C. 1995). The case analysis focused primarily on
adoption by unmarried couples rather than same-sex couples.
85 See In re Adoption of Two Children by H.N.R., 666 A.2d 535 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995).
8 See In re K.M. and D.M. to Adopt Olivia, 653 N.E.2d 888 (I11. App. Ct. 1996). Again, as in the
previous cases, the court engaged in an exercise of statutory construction to reach the conclusion that the
adoptions in question were not prohibited by statute and promoted the general purpose of the legislation.
87 See Nancy K. Kubasek et al., Fashioning a Tolerable Domestic Partners Statute in an Environ-
ment Hostile to Same-Sex Marriages, 7 LAw & SEX 55, 67-68 (1997). Two men sought permission to adopt a
foster child but were denied by the New Jersey Division of Youth and Family Services. The New Jersey
Superior Court, however, allowed the men to jointly adopt based on the state's best interest of the child stan-
dard. The men also brought a class action suit against the state, which then changed its policy to utilize the
same adoption standards for unmarried and married couples. See also Judith Havemann, Gay Couple in NJ.
Win Adoption Rights, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Dec. 18, 1997, at 2. The practical effects extend only to children
in the custody of the state but places unmarried and married couples on the same footing and allows both
adults to adopt jointly rather than the two-step process where one person adopts and then the second partner
petitions for adoption rights.
88 See In re Adoption of Baby Z., 724 A.2d 1035 (Conn. 1999).
89 See In the Interest of Angel Lace M., 516 N.W.2d 678 (Wis. 1994). Unlike the Connecticut case in
the previous footnote, the Wisconsin court, after determining that statutory construction did not permit the
adoption, addressed the constitutionality of such denial. The superficial review continually cites to the plural-
ity opinion in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
90 See In re T.K.J. and K.A.K., 931 P.2d 488 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996). The court engaged in a constitu-
tional discussion but, in a tortured analysis, applied rational basis rather than intermediate or strict scrutiny.
The flaw is obvious in a review from the child's perspective.
91 See In re Adoption of Jane Doe, 719 N.E.2d 1071 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998).
Although we are mindful of the dilemma facing the parties and are sympathetic to their
plight, it is not within the constitutional scope of judicial power to change the face and
effect of the plain meaning of R.C. 3107.15. This case is not about alternative lifestyles
but statutory construction. When we balance the spirit and motivation of the adoption
laws (as appellant argues) against the plain meaning of the statutory language created by
the state legislature, we are not empowered to find the "spirit" includes the issue pre-
sented sub judice.
Id. at 1073.
92 FLA. STAT. ANN. §63.042(3) (West 1997). No person otherwise eligible to adopt under the statute
may adopt if he or she is a homosexual.
93 See H.B. 90, 156th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.H. 1999) (enacted).
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adopting foster children,94 and a recent Arkansas agency enactment bans gays from
becoming foster parents.95
Adoption is a creature of statute,96 with rules and regulations that vary
from state to state.97 The statutory policy underlying adoption statutes is to protect
the best interest of the child, which is the paramount consideration. 98 However, the
courts' broad discretion 9 in construing best interests and in deciding adoption peti-
tionsl0 often lacks definition.0 1 Critical to a determination of the best interest of
the child is stability, continuity in the life of the child and a loving relationship.
02
Adoption statutes are often read liberally in order to protect the best inter-
ests of the child,103 and this is particularly so where courts have sanctioned same-
sex couple adoptions.
There are numerous legal, economic and psychological benefits that serve
the child's best interests by having two legally recognized parents. The second
parent would have the legal responsibility to provide clothing, food, shelter, educa-
94 See Holly Mullen, Utah Bans Some Adoptions by Gay Couples; Law Covers State-Fostered Chil-
dren Only; Unmarried Straight Couples Affected Too; Adoption Law Bars Some Placements with Gay Cou-
pies, SALT LAKE TRIBUNE, Jan. 23, 1999, at Al. The board of trustees of the State Division of Child and
Family Services voted to ban unmarried heterosexual couples and gay and lesbian partners from adopting
state-fostered children. The policy will not affect single parents or private adoptions.
95 See Ban on Gay Foster Parents Formally Approved, AP Newswire, March 25, 1999 (reporting on
the enactment by the Arkansas Child Welfare Agency Review Board of a measure banning homosexual foster
parents).
9 Adoption may well be a creature of statute, but the question can be raised whether it has become
part of our common law-a tradition so deeply rooted that it is entitled to historical respect or sanctity. See
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (language used by Justice Scalia).
97 See Mark Strasser, Legislative Presumptions and Judicial Assumptions: On Parenting, Adoption,
and the Best Interest of the Child, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 49, 64 (1996).
98 See In re M.M.D. & B.H.M, 662 A.2d 837, 837 (D.C. 1995).
99 The question of broad judicial discretion is dangerous, however, because gay and lesbian parents
are frequently held to a higher standard than heterosexual parents. Sexual orientation is sometimes considered
a disqualifying factor for parenting, even though empirical data suggests the falsity of such assumptions. See
Susan J. Becker, Child Sexual Abuse Allegations Against a Lesbian or Gay Parent in a Custody or Visitation
Dispute: Battling the Overt and Insidious Bias of Experts and Judges, 74 DENVER U. L. REV. 75, 94 (1996).
100 See Suzanne Bryant, Second ParentAdoption: A Model Brief, 2 DuKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 233,
236 (1995).
101 See Sultan, supra note 75, at 61-62.
102 See Mitchell Waldman, Nature and Substance of "Best Interests" Analysis; Factors Considered, 2
AM. JUR. 2d Adoptions § 137 (1994). Factors in a best interests analysis vary from case to case and, absent an
extreme adverse factor, no single factor is absolute. Some of the factors which have been considered include
desires of the child, present or future effects of adoption, emotional and physical needs of the child, the
child's emotional ties and interaction with prospective parent, parental abilities of individuals seeking cus-
tody, plans for the child, living arrangements, stability of environment, and adjustment of the child to the
living situation.
103 Professor Nayo argues that the right to be adopted deserves recognition as an individual liberty
interest of the unadopted child. While she does not distinguish between primary parent and stepparent (sec-
ond-parent) adoptions, if such a liberty interest exists on behalf of the child, it may provide a benefit to the
adoptive parent otherwise denied by statute. See Nayo, supra note 35, at 53; see also infra Part III.B.
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tion and medical care, as well as child support, should the couple separate. If only
one parent has legal rights to the child and that parent dies, the child does not have
the legal guarantee, and is denied the emotional security, of knowing he or she
could continue to live with the surviving parent.'04 If the couple should separate,
the child may tragically be denied the right to visitation by his or her non-legal
parent.1 °5
In addition, if both parents are recognized as legal parent, the child could
inherit through intestate succession, be eligible for coverage under health insurance
policies and receive Social Security benefits if either parent were deceased or dis-
abled. Hospitals, schools and other institutions would be enabled to allow both
parents to make decisions regarding the child.'06
A child does not comprehend the importance of the legal and economic
benefits of adoption. What matters is the strength of the emotional relationship
maintained by the child with the parents. A young child does not know about blood
ties with a parent; the child is not concerned with the physical realities of concep-
tion or whether the relationship develops because of biology or adoption. What is
important to the child is the day-to-day relationship with the parent who loves, nur-
tures and shares the child's companionship, and in effect, becomes the "psycho-
logical parent."
10 7
It is of the utmost importance for the physical and psychological well-
being and development of the child to have an adult who wants and loves the child.
If a child is bom to parents who do not want the child, the chances for healthy
growth and development are greatly reduced.'08 A reading of the relevant court
cases has consistently shown that same-sex couples who want legal recognition of
their families have planned for and wanted their children and have sought legal
recognition as being in the children's best interest. Children deserve no less than
that courts be willing to acknowledge these families.10 9
Foster parenting is another way the law creates a legal relationship where
no biological tie exists. There are differing views as to whether lesbian and gay
individuals should be permitted to be foster parents. For example, Nancy D.
Polikoff, a professor of law at American University's Washington College of Law,
See Bryant, supra note 100, at 239-40.
105 See Nancy S. v. Michele G., 228 Cal. App. 3d 831 (1991), where two lesbians who were raising
one of their children separated, and the biological mother sought sole custody. The partner contended she was
a psychological parent but the court denied custody or visitation as she was not a legal parent. The court
acknowledged the resulting situation was tragic and the child would suffer. See also Alison D. v. Virginia M.,
572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991); In re Thompson, I I S.W.3d 913 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).
106 See Bryant, supra note 100, at 240-41.
107 JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 13, 16-17 (1979).
1oa See id. at 20.
109 The role of the courts in providing for the best interest of the children is most likely the explana-
tion for the relative success that partners have enjoyed in obtaining legal ties to their children through adop-
tion. See Maxwell S. Peltz, Second-Parent Adoption: Overcoming Barriers to Lesbian Family Rights, 3
MICH. 1. GENDER& L. 175, 177-78 (1995).
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believes that gay and lesbian foster parents are a necessity and that there are not
enough of them.110 On the other hand, Joseph Evall, an attorney practicing law in
New York City, does not believe that lesbian and/or gay foster parents are neces-
sary."
It also should be noted that no state presently has a statute banning the li-
censing of gay foster parents, New Hampshire having recently repealed its statutory
ban.
112
Although gay foster parents are becoming more and more prevalent, some
members of society still refuse to accept the fact that homosexual individuals, in-
cluding children, have a right to a family. There are two main advantages to allow-
ing homosexuals to be licensed as foster parents. First, a homosexual is more adept
at teaching a homosexual child how to cope with the ridicule and alienation that
such a homosexual child will probably face. Although heterosexual parents may be
able to teach a homosexual child the requisite coping skills, these parents never
experienced the feelings that the children have to deal with and, thus, cannot truly
empathize. Second, by prohibiting any individual from becoming a foster parent,
society is clearly depriving some children of a family. Where people are willing to
take on the difficult job of caring for children as their own, society should not dis-
courage such beneficence based on the foster parent candidate's sexual orientation
alone. Homosexuality does not equal bad parenting.
The third method in which a child may become the child of a same-sex un-
ion is a deliberate attempt by the partners to create this relationship. This may be
the result of a surrogate parenting contract or similar relationship, whereby one of
the biological parents is essentially used as a fertility tool and then withdraws from
the life of the child he or she creates in favor of the adult partner of the other bio-
logical parent.
Lesbians have been the most prolific participants in the same-sex parenting
baby boom. 113 They typically make use of artificial insemination with the aid of a
sperm donor who is either completely anonymous to them or someone whom they
know but who will not be a part of the planned family circle.114 When a child is
born as a result of artificial insemination, there is a major obstacle that stands in the
way of that child becoming a member of a societally accepted family: only the bio-
logical mother is recognized as having a legal relationship with the child. Even
though both partners collaboratively decided to have a child, decided who would
actually give birth to the child, and share completely in the upbringing of the child,
financially and emotionally, in the eyes of the law the non-biological parent is
deemed a "legal stranger" to the child. Because the law does not recognize the
110 See Nancy D. Polikoff, Resisting "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" in the Licensing of Lesbian and Gay
Foster Parents: Why Openness Will Benefit Lesbian and Gay Youth, 48 HASTINOS L.J. 1183 (1997).
ill See Joseph Evall, Sexual Orientation andAdoptive Matching, 25 FAM. L.Q. 347 (1991).
112 See H.B. 90, 156th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.H. 1999) (enacted).
113 See Christensen, supra note 45, at 1730.
114 See id. at 1758.
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status of the non-biological parent, the child may be deprived of rights that are usu-
ally incident to the parental relationship, such as inheritance rights. If the biological
mother should die or become incapacitated due to a debilitating illness, the child's
relationship with the non-biological parent or parents, who may be the only other
parent(s) the child has ever known, may be severed at the discretion of an
unsympathetic judge. 15 The narrow definition of family that refuses to legally
recognize the emotional bond between the child and non-biological parent gives no
protection to the relationship.
16
By contrast, where a husband's wife is artificially inseminated by an
anonymous sperm donor, the husband, who has no biological connection to the
resulting child, typically has immediate parental rights and obligations. In over
thirty states, the husband will acquire these parental rights automatically by state
statute. Even if there is no statute on the books, the same result will most probably
be reached. This is because those states without such statutes rely on the common
law presumption of legitimacy, that a husband is deemed to be the father of any
child born during a marriage. The non-biological lesbian parent does not have the
same protected status, through statute or common law. The only way she could
become a legally recognized parent is through the process of adoption.'
17
If gay male couples want to have a biological connection with the child
they wish to have, they can enter into a surrogacy arrangement by which a woman
agrees to conceive a child with donated sperm provided by one of the partners and
then give the child up when it is born to be raised by the donor and his partner.
Surrogate contracts are banned in many jurisdictions; however, in a growing num-
ber of states, surrogacy arrangements are either explicitly authorized by statute or
otherwise legally permitted. The problem is that the statutes are crafted to aid mar-
ried couples rather than same-sex couples." 8
The Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act avoids the
outright endorsement of surrogacy contracts, but it does propose a mechanism for
legally validating surrogacy arrangements.1 9 For qualifying couples, the Act pro-
vides that "upon birth of a child to the surrogate, the intended parents are the par-
ents of the child," and the surrogate has no parental role.120 By definition, "intended
parents" are limited to "a man and woman, married to each other, who enter into an
115 See id. at 1759.
116 See Tsippi Wray, Lesbian Relationships and Parenthood: Models for Legal Recognition of Non-
traditional Families, 21 HAMLINE L. REv. 127, 131 (1997); see also Holtzman v. Knott, 533 N.W.2d 49
(Wis. 1995), In re Alison D., 572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991); Nancy S. v. Michele G., 228 Cal. App. 3d 831
(1991).
117 See Christensen, supra note 45, at 1760.
118 See id. at 1762.
119 See id.
120 See id. (citing UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT § 8(a)(1) (West Supp.
1997)). Of those states that have adopted statutes based on the Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Con-
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agreement... that they will be the parents of a child born to a surrogate through
assisted conception. '  Since the term "intended parents" fails to include same-sex
couples, the best that can be hoped for in the present state of the law is that the
partner who donated the sperm will have parental status and that the rights of the
surrogate mother will be relinquished. The partner who is not recognized as having
parental status under the law, in order to become a legally recognized parent, will
have to begin adoption proceedings, which creates problems for the biological par-
ent."
What must be noted about all of the preceding scenarios is that the child
has no voice in the establishment of the parent-child relationship or whether the
parents can marry; the reality of the child's life, at least to the child, does not de-
pend on legal rules or definitions.123 The child is simply a product of the union - a
product which may or may not have rights similar to those of other children whose
parents happen to be legally married to each other or at least have the right to be so.
The child plays no part in the creation of the family unit; the child merely partici-
pates in, and benefits from, the relationships that arise out of the family.
24
B. A Child's Right to Be Part of a Family
The bulk of jurisprudence concerning family relationships is adult-
centered 121 - that is, focused on the legal rights of the adult parent (biological, legal
or de facto) to maintain a family relationship and to regulate the conduct and well-
being of the child. 26 Most of the cases are viewed from the perspective of parent
See Christensen, supra note 45, at 1762 (citing . UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED
CONCEPTION ACT § 1(3)).
122 See id. at 1763.
123 See Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the
Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 459, 473 (1990).
124 See Gilbert A. Holmes, The Tie that Binds: The Constitutional Right of Children to Maintain
Relationships with Parent-Like Individuals, 53 MD. L. REV. 358, 392 (1994).
125 That is not to say that the child's needs are not relevant in such an adult-centered concept. In her
article, Nancy D. Polikoff argues for redefining parenthood to include any adult who serves in a "functional
parental relationship" with a child, although she is careful to include in her requirement that the relationship
by the non-blood or non-legal adult be created by a legally recognized parent. See Polikoff, supra note 123, at
464. One of the points of Professor Polikoffs theory is that children will ultimately benefit, because expand-
ing the definition of parent will allow courts to be less concerned with legal title and more concerned with
pure best interests in determining custody, visitation and guardianship.
In resolving disputes about the custody of children, the court system should recognize
the reality of children's lives, however unusual or complex. Courts should design rules
to serve children's best interests. By failing to do so, they perpetuate the fiction of fam-
ily homogeneity at the expense of the children whose reality does not fit this form.
Id. at 469.
126 Parental rights are closely linked with an historic legacy of viewing the child as the family's
private property, which, like other economic rights, is secured from state expropriation, confiscation, or
regulatory taking. See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Out of Children's Needs, Children's Rights: The Child's
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against state and, with limited exceptions, the parent's right to intra-familial pri-
vacy is preserved. 127 A new approach is being developed, a child-centered ap-
proach, which focuses on the independent rights and needs of the child to develop a
liberty interest for the child in establishing or maintaining a family relationship
with a parent or one in loco parentis. The important work of Gilbert Holmes and
Barbara Bennett Woodhouse lead the way in this new analysis of a child's constitu-
tional interests.
128
All of the aforementioned cases involving family integrity129 affirmed the
integrity of the unitary family.1 30 They were brought by the parents against a gov-
emmental entity which threatened to take control of decisions that belonged within
the family.131 With the exception of Justice Douglas's dissent in Yoder, there is
precious little discussion of the child's independent interest as a member of the
family. 132 The discourse involving family issues of parent against child deals
mostly with aberrant or criminal behavior - situations involving abuse or aban-
donment.
133
Entrenched attitudes about child-rearing present a great obstacle to moving the legal system to-
ward a child-centered jurisprudence and away from the current, adult-centered jurisprudence. See James G.
Dwyer, Children's Interests in a Family Context-A Cautionary Note, 39 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1053, 1055
(1999).
127 See generally Troxel v. Granville, 120 S. Ct. 2054 (2000); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer
v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
128 See Holmes, supra note 124; Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered
Perspective on Parents' Rights, 14 CARDOZO L. REv. 1747 (1993); see also Woodhouse, Out of Children's
Needs, supra note 126. I am especially grateful to Professor Holmes for suggestions he made in the develop-
ment of this paper.
129 See cases cited supra note 127.
Although [these] cases arose from dissimilar controversies, they uniformly failed to rec-
ognize that children have an independent right to maintain or sever family relationships.
The courts in each of these cases achieved results arguably consistent with the 'best in-
terests of the child' doctrine, but the individual decisions, in reality, were inconsistent
with that doctrine because each focused on the adults'-rather than the child's-status
and rights in the relationship. As a result, the courts in these cases in many respects vic-
timized, rather than protected, the children by denying them a voice in resolving ques-
tions of and access to relationships with important parent figures.
Holmes, supra note 124, at 380.
130 See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123 (1989). Justice Scalia, writing for a plurality,
stated: "[Stanley v. Illinois, Quilloin v. Walcott, Caban v. Mohammed and Lehr v. Robertson] rest.., upon
the historic respect-indeed, sanctity would not be too strong a term-traditionally accorded to the relation-
ships that develop within the unitary family." Id. (citations and footnote omitted).
131 See cases cited supra note 127.
132 See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 241 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part). I am reminded of a case I once tried,
an educational neglect proceeding brought against the father because he refused to allow his 17-year-old
daughter to participate in physical education, jeopardizing her ability to receive a high school diploma. The
objection was for religious reasons. The child herself testified as to the sincerity of her beliefs and the court
dismissed the petition, finding that the child held her religious beliefs independently of her father, and it was
this distinction (among others) which prevented her from participating in physical education. See In re
Hickey, 477 N.Y.S.2d 258 (N.Y. Faro. Ct. 1984).
133 See Dwyer, supra note 126, at 1056 ("The rights and preferences of parents may coincide to some
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When the Supreme Court considered the issue of whether parents should
have the authority to make certain decisions regarding the mental hospitalization of
their child in Parham v. J.R.,' 34 the Court stated:
The law's concept of the family rests on a presumption that par-
ents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capac-
ity for judgment required for making life's difficult decisions.
More important, historically it has recognized that natural bonds
of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their chil-
dren ....
In defining the respective rights and prerogatives of the child
and parent in the voluntary commitment setting, we conclude that
our precedents permit the parents to retain a substantial, if not the
dominant, role in the decision, absent a finding of neglect or
abuse, and that the traditional presumption that the parents act in
the best interests of their child should apply.'
35
In the present context, however, all these cases are of limited utility be-
cause they are centered on the rights, needs and responsibilities of the adult."a
Even where the cases acknowledge a child's claim, the child's rights are subordi-
nated to the adult's rights.'37 Viewing these cases from the parent's perspective
creates an all-or-nothing resolution of family conflicts. 38 To achieve a constitu-
tional analysis from the perspective of the child, two additional questions must be
asked beyond the basic issue of the right to form a family relatively free from gov-
degree with the interests of children, but rarely do so perfectly and often do so very little.").
134 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
135 Id. at 602, 604.
136 "The Court has in fact said that the interest in family life is one that runs between parent and child,
for the benefit of the child, and with responsibilities running from parent to child concomitant with the par-
ent's rights." Nayo, supra note 35, at 87. See also Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 257 (1983); Quilloin v.
Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978). If the interest runs "between" parent and child, then the parent cannot be said
to have an exclusive hold on the constitutional liberty interest, but the child should have a separate and inde-
pendent share of it for constitutional adjucatory purposes.
137 See Holmes, supra note 124, at 381. He argues that the Supreme Court has already expanded the
constitutional review of family relationships beyond solely a parent-centered model. See Moore v. City of
East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 506 (1977); Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431
U.S. 816, 843 (1977). Even in Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999), while recognizing the security of
children as a purpose of the marriage statutes, the court still decided the issue of same-sex marriage based on
the rights of the adults. See infra Part V.
138 This is especially inadequate when the dispute is between a blood or legal relative on the one hand
and a defacto, but not legal, parent on the other. See Holmes, supra note 124, at 362.
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emmental control.
First, we must examine whether a child has any rights or liberty interests of
his or her own'39 - whether a child can exist as an independent legal entity separate
and apart from the parent.
The recognition of children's liberty interest embodies a jurispru-
dence and social policy that identifies children as persons who
need protection. The liberty interest of children rests philosophi-
cally on the need to facilitate the transition of developing citizens
from childhood to adulthood and doctrinally on the recognition of
children as persons under the Constitution.14
If the child possesses separate and definable due process rights, 141 then the child
may have standing to challenge a governmental determination, such as the denial of
a marriage license to the parents. Where an equal protection claim is asserted, a
minor may very well have such standing.
142
The Court took a major step toward recognizing general fundamental
rights for children in 1967 when it established that a minor possessed procedural
due process rights in a delinquency proceeding. 143 In In re Gault, the Court stated
that "neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults
alone."' 44
In a non-criminal context, the Court stated in Tinker v. Des Moines Inde-
pendent Community School District that "[s]tudents in school as well as out of
school are 'persons' under our Constitution. They are possessed of fundamental
139 "An analysis of the child's liberty interest must extend to children the privileges and immunities
accorded 'persons' under the Constitution or must provide an acceptable rationale for excluding children from
his constitutional protection." Id. at 383 n. 155.
140 Id. at 384 n.157.
141 See id. at 396-97. "The Supreme Court has held unconstitutional state statutory schemes that do
not accord standing to individuals who have substantive due process rights in family relationships." Id at
396. See, e.g., Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 393-94 (1979); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658
(1972). If the Supreme Court were to recognize a child's liberty interest in such a relationship, it would also
have to recognize the child's substantive due process rights and standing in a family-standing dispute. See
Holmes, supra note 124, at 396-97.
One case which supposedly stands for the proposition that the child has standing to terminate one
family relationship and establish another is Gregory K., In re Kingsley, No. JU90-5245, 1992 WL 551484
(Fla. Cir. Ct. Oct. 21, 1992), aff'd in part and rev 'd in part sub nom. Kingsley v. Kingsley, 623 So. 2d 780
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993), where the child allegedly received permission to "divorce" his mother. I think the
case is nothing more than a trumped-up termination of parental rights case and, on appeal, the boy's standing
was challenged, although the termination and subsequent adoption were upheld.
142 See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 193-97 (1976). The beer vendor in Craig was determined
to havejus tertii standing to assert an equal protection claim on behalf of males aged 18-20 years old in
challenging the constitutionality of the Oklahoma statute prohibiting the sale of 3.2 percent beer to males 18
to 20 years of age while placing no such restriction on the sale of beer to females of the same age. See id.
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rights which the State must respect, just as they themselves must respect their obli-
gations to the State."'45
Cases such as Gault and Tinker establish, at a minimum, that the child can
possess constitutional rights personal to the individual. Where the Court recognizes
the constitutional "personhood" of a child, it generally requires the states to go to
fairly significant lengths before they can infringe on the rights of these children. 46
The second inquiry becomes more specific-the child's right to family
benefits independent of the parents. 147 If the child has an independent constitutional
right to benefits flowing from the child's status as a family member, and these
benefits are denied simply because the parents cannot marry, a status over which
the child has no control, then a constitutional right may flow from the child to the
parent and compel the conclusion that the parents must possess the right to marry to
preserve the rights of the child.
For the child, even more so than the adult, it is necessary to separate sexu-
ality from the relationship between the parent and child. 4 ' When conceptualized in
this way, the right to the relationship is viewed within the Fourteenth Amendment's
concept of "ordered liberty.' '149 A child-centered analysis reverses the emphasis,
but also eliminates some of the arguments leveled against the parents which have
been used to sustain the denial of same-sex couples to marry. 50
Children draw their claims for family membership not from a sense of in-
dividual freedom, but from a status of dependency and the need for functional par-
enting.151 We must consider the child's perspective in redefining the term "family"
to promote values of nurture, commitment and interdependence.'52 If the child is
treated as an actor in a family relationship, rather than an object, the law can give
primacy to the child's needs and reconsider the rights of the surrounding family
145 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969).
146 See Nayo, supra note 35, at 52-53.
147 The Ninth Circuit found that a child had a cognizable liberty interest and reasoned that a child's
loss of support, society and companionship of a parent presented a stronger case for recovery (where the
father had been killed by police officers) than that of a parent seeking recovery for loss of a child. See Smith
v. City of Fontana, 818 F.2d 1411, 1418-19 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 935 (1987).
148 In fact, legal strides are being made in recognizing nontraditional heterosexual families and the
needs of the children of these non-married parents. Rules developed to serve the needs of these families
should equally apply to same-sex families. See Polikoff, supra note 123, at 543. Polikoff discusses three
theories of establishing parenthood used by some courts to grant rights to a non-legal parent: equitable par-
enthood, child-parent relationship and nonexclusive parenthood. See id. 483-91.
149 See Devjani Mishra, The Road to Concord: Resolving the Conflict of Law over Adoption by Gays
and Lesbians, 30 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 91, 135 (1996) (citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325
(1937)).
150 Such arguments include immorality and personal choice. Where one can argue that an adult at
least has some control and some choice over his or her own lifestyle, a child is an innocent bystander and has
no control over the composition of the family unit or its other members.
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members through the needs of the child.
153
IV. A CHILD'S BENEFIT IN BEING A CHILD OF A MARRIED COUPLE
A. Tax Benefits
Federal tax law does not define marital status; instead it defers to state law
determinations of marital status.154 Marital status has a crucial impact upon an indi-
vidual's federal income tax liability. 55 "Filing status, personal exemptions, exclu-
sions, deductions, and tax credits are affected by whether a taxpayer is single or
married."'156 Married couples enjoy many federal tax benefits to which same-sex
couples are not entitled. There are some benefits to single people because the single
economic unit of a married couple tends to push the couple into a higher tax
bracket than two single individuals with the same total income.'57 This marriage
"penalty," however, could be eliminated by a modest restructuring of the tax
code.158 Congress's preferential treatment of married couples violates the tax code's
goal of horizontal equity; i.e., similarly situated taxpayers are treated disparately
instead of at a similar rate as the goal mandates. 59 "[S]ince most married couples
operate as a single economic unit, the income tax treats spouses as a single taxpay-
ing unit whose tax liability is dependent upon its total taxable income."
1'6
Looking at both same-sex and heterosexual couples, any reasonable person
can come to the conclusion that many of the characteristics are the same for both.
Their economic arrangements are the same because they live together and share
various finances as well as resources. In essence, the same-sex couples act as mar-
ried heterosexual couples, but their status is not recognized by the federal govern-
ment. "As compared to same-sex couples, married couples are given preferential
treatment by the government, employers, insurers, and private organizations.' 81
It has been estimated that almost two hundred sections of the Tax Code are
153 See id.
154 See Daniel J. Lathrope, State-Defined Marital Status: Its Future as an Operative Tax Factor, 17
U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 257,260 (1983).
155 See id. at 257.
156 Id.
157 See Jonathan Barry Forman, What Can Be Done About Marriage Penalties, 30 FAM. L.Q. 1, 5-10
(1996).
158 "Given the growing emphasis on family values, Congress just might enact such a marriage-
rewarding system, notwithstanding the objections of those unmarried individuals who would concomitantly
see an increase in their single penalties." Id. at 10.
159 See Christopher T. Nixon, Should Congress Revise the Tax Code to Extend the Same Tax Benefits
to Same-Sex Couples as Are Currently Granted to Married Couples?: An Analysis in Light of Horizontal
Equity, 23 S. ILL. U. L.J. 41, 45 (1998).
160 Lathrope, supra note 154, at 257-58.
161 Adam Chase, Tax Planning for Same-Sex Couples, 72 DENy. U. L. REv. 359, 360 (1995).
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affected by marital status.162 The first benefit that married couples are entitled to,
but same-sex couples are not, is the right to file joint tax returns. 16 Married taxpay-
ers are generally permitted to file joint returns in which they aggregate their in-
come, gains, losses, deductions and credits. 16 Although married couples may elect
to file separately, the rate tables are structured so that separate filing almost always
results in increased tax liability. The rates that are applied to married taxpayers
filing separate returns are the same as the rates applied to married taxpayers filing
jointly with exactly twice as much taxable income. 16s Joint filing allows a married
couple to split, in effect, their total income and obtain the benefit of lower marginal
tax rates."6
"The marital relationship confers upon heterosexual couples special legal
and social advantages affecting their taxes, intestate succession, health care, insur-
ance, organizational memberships, and their means of holding real estate." '167 Addi-
tional federal tax benefits are granted to couples that marry.16s Such couples can
"transfer wealth and property to each other during marriage completely free of fed-
eral income, gift or estate taxes."' 69 Gifts can be excluded from gross income, and
thus are excluded from taxable income.170 Also, the Code provides a 100 percent
marital deduction for lifetime gifts between spouses.' 7'
Married couples do not incur income taxes when they take advantage of
various benefits offered by their spouse's employer.7" Such benefits include health
insurance; however, in cases where same-sex couples also get health coverage, only
married employees obtain the benefit of the tax exemption for the value of their
partner's health coverage,173 while the employee with a same-sex partner must re-
port the value of the benefit to his or her partner as income and pay taxes on it.174
According to the Internal Revenue Code, if a married couple's taxable in-
162 See supra note 71.
163 See I.R.C. § 6013(a) (1994 & Supp. 111996). Tax status is determined at the close of the taxable
year. See I.R.C. § 6013(d)(1)(A).
164 See I.R.C. § 6013(a).
165 See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS., INCOME TAX TREATMENT OF
MARRIED COUPLES AND SINGLE PERSONS 8 (Comm. Print 1980).
166 See a
167 Chase, supra note 161, at 361 (citation omitted).
168 See Nixon, supra note 159, at 47.
169 Id.
170 See I.R.C. §§ 61,63, 102(a) (1994).
171 See I.t.C. § 2523(a) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
172 See I.RC. § 102(c)(1) (1994); I.R.C. § 106 (1994, Supp. 111996 & Supp. 1997).
173 See David L. Chambers, What I?. The Legal Consequences of Marriage and the Legal Needs of
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come175 combined is $60,000, then their taxes would be a flat rate of $6,457.50176
plus 28 percent of the excess over $43,050.17 This would bring the total to $11,204
for tax year 1999. A same-sex couple, earning the same amount of money but de-
prived of the ability to legally marry, would have to file separate tax returns. If a
same-sex couple with a child were to have one wage earner - that is, one person in
the work force while the other person stayed home and cared for the child and the
home - and the wage earner earned the same amount of money as the married cou-
ple, $60,000, the same-sex couple would have to pay $13,453 in taxes for the
year.178 The individual tax return filed by the person in the same-sex relationship,
compared to the joint tax return of the married couple, depletes the family's dispos-
able net income.
The difference in the tax amounts is $2,249. This is considerably more
than the married couple has to pay in taxes, and the additional income remains
available for use by the family, benefiting the children. The same-sex couples, be-
cause they are unable to file a joint tax return, are paying money in taxes they could
otherwise spend on their child.17 9 As the chart below indicates, the married couple
pays less than two individuals, and the availability of a child as an exemption re-
duces the tax considerably.
The legalization of same-sex marriages and the demise of the Defense of
Marriage Act would allow the same-sex couple to file joint tax returns. The same-
175 Taxable income is defined as the "gross income minus the deductions allowed." I.R.C. § 63(a)
(1994). Gross income is defined as "all income from whatever source derived." I.R.C. § 61(a)(a)-(15) (1994).
176 The figures in this paragraph are based on rates for the 1998 tax year.
177 See I.R.C. § l(a)(2) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
178 See I.R.C. § 1(c) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
179 The following chart shows the difference more graphically. It assumes a standard deduction and
no extra exemptions (unless specified). It also assumes no adjustments to gross income to achieve adjusted
gross income. The result is the federal tax based on 1998 tax tables:















60,000 married, no children 7802
60,000 married, one child 6646
*Refund due to Earned Income Credit.
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sex couple, similarly situated to the heterosexual married couple in terms of income
and household composition, would then possess an equal amount of after-tax
money to spend on the family.
The regulation of dependent exemptions is another aspect of the tax code
that burdens the same-sex couple and hurts the child of that relationship.18 Accord-
ing to the Internal Revenue Code, if, in a same-sex union, the wage earner is not the
biological parent of a child who resides in the household, that Wage earner cannot
claim the child as a dependent and receive a deduction. Nowhere in the definition
of "dependent" in the statute' 8' would this type of situation enable the wage earning
non-biological parent to fall into the category, which will enable him or her to de-
duct the dependent child.
Not allowing the parent to deduct the dependent on his or her tax return
takes away valuable funds the family could use on the child. The deduction, ac-
cording to the Code, enables the wage-earning parent to deduct money spent on the
dependent from taxable income. If the money is deducted then the amount of in-
come that can be taxed is decreased. The lesser the amount to be taxed, the more
money there is for the family to spend. By not allowing the non-biological wage
earner of a same-sex relationship to deduct the expenses of the dependent child, the
government is depriving that family of valuable resources to provide the same
amenities to the child of that relationship.
Another area of taxation that heterosexual married couples receive benefits
from deals with the estate and gift tax. The taxes paid upon the death of a spouse
include deductions for the surviving spouse. In computing the gross estate, the
"value of any interest in property which passes ... from the decedent to the surviv-
ing spouse is deducted from the value of the gross estate. 182 A survivor of a same-
sex relationship is not eligible for this tax deduction. The taxes will have to be paid,
and that in turn takes away financial resources the surviving parent would be able
to spend on the child. The homosexual survivor is similarly situated with that of the
heterosexual survivor, yet the gay/lesbian parent will have to pay more taxes and
have less to spend on the child.
In addition to the surviving spouse deduction, Title 26 also has a deduction
for a gift to a spouse.'83 As mentioned earlier, this only applies to the spouse of a
heterosexual marriage. By not forcing the spouse of a marriage to pay tax on a gift,
more money can be spent on the child of that marriage. The parent receiving the
gift cannot only use the property on the child, but also the money saved on taxes
can be spent on the child as well. The "spouse" of the same-sex relationship can
give the other a gift, but they will have to pay taxes on the gift, again being denied
180 Phillip S. Home, Lmv & Sexuality: A Review of Lesbian and Gay Legal Issues - Challenging
Public-and-Private-Sector Benefit Schemes Which Discriminate Against Unmarried Opposite-Sex and Same-
Sex Partners, 4 LAw & SEx. 35, 42 (1994).
181 See I.R.C. § 152 (1994). The definition of dependent does, however, include stepchildren and
stepparents and certain in-laws.
182 I.R.C. § 2056 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
183 See I.RC. § 2523 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
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a benefit available only to legally married couples.
Same-sex couples use various means to "beat the system" and obtain some
of the same privileges that are bestowed on married couples. "One of the more
creative methods by which lesbian and gay couples have sought to obtain some of
the benefits bestowed upon married couples is to have one partner adopt the
other."' 84 Adult adoption is the adoption of one adult by another, creating a rela-
tionship of parent and child, with the exception that the adopting partner has no
legal duty to support the adopted partner. This creates a legal union between the
two.
Same-sex couples can also open joint bank accounts because there are no
tax ramifications. "Same-sex couples don't qualify for the tax treatment applicable
to married couples upon their dissolution..'.. "Support payments between same-sex
partners upon dissolution likely would not be income to the recipient partner or
deductible to the payer."'
Furthermore, there are differences between the estate tax treatment of mar-
ried couples and unmarried couples. There are special provisions for married cou-
ples such as "only one-half of property held in joint tenancy or tenancy by the en-
tirety is included in the estate of a decedent spouse, while the amount included for a
[same-sex decedent partner] is determined based upon contribution."
'1 87
An illustrative example is a situation where the spouse dies and leaves a $1
million estate to his wife; his estate owes no taxes. But if a partner from a same-sex
relationship dies leaving the same amount, then the living same-sex partner would
only receive about half of the estate due to taxes owed on it. 188 Thus, a bequest to
the other spouse upon death is not taxable under the federal estate laws.
B. Immigration
Although immigration into the United States is no longer statutorily denied
to homosexuals, special immigration standing granted to same-sex spouses is still
denied, although similar standing is granted to spouses in legally recognized het-
erosexual marriages. 89 The effect of this denial may be to prevent a parent of a
child from entering or remaining in the United States, denying the child the right to
live with his or her parent.
In 1990, Congress repealed the previous provision under which homosexu-
als were excludable.' 90 The definition of spouse, however, was not amended, and
184 Chase, supra note 161, at 386.
185 Id. at 387.
186 Id. at 391.
187 Id. (citing I.R.C. § 2040 (1994)).
188 See id.; I.R.C. § 2056(a) (1994).
189 See 8 U.S.C. §1 153(a)(2) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
190 See Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 601(a), 104 Stat. 4978.
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the Defense of Marriage Act specifically defines marriage as "only a legal union
between one man and one woman."'' The Act is binding on federal agencies and
administrative bureaus.
Efforts to circumvent this policy have failed. Even before either of the
statutes was enacted, a court had ruled that Congress had the power to deny prefer-
ential status to spouses of homosexual marriages. 192 There the court found it was
not necessary to determine the validity of a Colorado "marriage" between two men.
The court relied on Congress' continuing intent to exclude homosexuals and the
"ordinary" meaning of the term spouse.
The question of spousal status is important because, under INS rules, a
child has no independent standing or status to seek immigration of a parent until the
child is twenty-one.' 93 It is therefore possible that a minor, whether a United States
citizen by birth or adoption, may be separated during childhood from one of the
legal parents who is unable to enter this country legally. If any special standing
exists, it must exist with the "spouse" or other adult. If, however, the parents are
denied the right to marry, this status can never be attained, putting aside the issue of
constitutionality of the Defense of Marriage Act.
194
C. Government Benefits
In 1996, Congress passed the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA). 195 The
Act defines marriage as a legal union between a man and a woman.'9 The Act also
defines the word "spouse" as referring only to people of the opposite sex who are
legally married.197 The Act enables only those individuals who are legally married
to be eligible to receive benefits from the federal government. 198 At the time
DOMA was enacted, Congress was concerned with retaining the sanctity of hetero-
sexual marriage and promoting the traditional moral teachings reflected in hetero-
sexual-only marriage.' 99 What Congress neglected to consider when passing
DOMA was the effect the denial of benefits would have on the children of same-
sex relationships. These children, because their parents are unable to legally marry,
191 Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (Supp. III 1997)).
Moreover, under the Act, "the word 'spouse' refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or
wife." Id
192 See Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 1982).
193 See 8 U.S.C. §1 151(b)(2)(A)(i) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
194 See Cynthia M. Reed, When Love, Comity, and Justice'Conquer Borders: INS Recognition of
Same-Sex Marriage, 28 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 97, 127-33 (1996).




199 See H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 16 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2919-20.
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are the ones who suffer. They are denied benefits that children of marriages receive
just because of their parents' legal marital status.
Same-sex couples, with or without children, consider themselves a family.
Same-sex couples with children specifically define family to include their child or
children. A person in a same-sex partnership considers the child of the relationship
part of the family even if that child is not the biological child of one or both of the
partners. The federal government, as well as state and local governments, must
define family in determining the benefits they will confer on the household. Unfor-
tunately, with the passage of the Defense of Marriage Act, as well as judicial de-
terminations across the country, families formed from same-sex relationships, in-
cluding ones with children, are not considered a family in the eyes of the law.
The legislative and judicial branches of government, both state and federal,
define family in a way that does not include the partner of a same-sex couple. By
denying same-sex partners the right to be considered family in the eyes of the law,
the child of that union is the one who suffers, even more than the parents. The par-
ents are able to take care of themselves while the child, especially a young child, is
dependent on adults. The needs of the child are visible and realistic, yet the gov-
ernment declines to confer benefits on the family because of the gender of the par-
ents.
According to a study conducted by the General Accounting Office, there
are over 1,000 "benefits, rights, and privileges [that] are contingent on marriage.
' 200
These are benefits that a child of a heterosexual marriage can receive. Among these
benefits are Social Security benefits that are paid to dependent spouses. Married
couples generally receive more benefits than single individuals, 2 1 and minor chil-
dren are eligible to receive survivor's benefits.
If the non-biological parent of a same-sex relationship dies by some
wrongful act of another, the biological parent will not be able to bring a wrongful
death suit against the tortfeasor. Furthermore, because there is no legal family rela-
tionship between the deceased and the child, that child will not have standing to sue
for wrongful death. If the primary or only wage earner of the same-sex couple is the
one that dies, the child will suffer because of the lost finances. That child will be
unable to make the person responsible civilly liable for the pain and loss the child
feels. The married heterosexual counterpart of the same-sex couple, however, will
have standing to sue the wrongdoer for wrongful death, ensuring that the child of
that marriage is financially provided for.
The wrongful death statues in both Texas202 and Louisiana 03 require the
individual bringing the wrongful death action to be a spouse or a child of the de-
ceased. Problems arise if a child is not the biological son or daughter of the de-
20O FEDERAL DOCUMENT CLEARING HOUSE, REPORT TO HONORABLE HENRY HYDE JR., available in
1997 WL 67783 (F.D.C.H.). See also supra notes 71, 162.
201 This is especially significant where the biological parent has chosen to stay at home and the non-
biological parent is the primary wage earner. See Forman, supra note 157, at 16.
202 TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.004 (West 1985).
203 LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315.1 (West 1986).
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ceased parent. The child will not have standing to sue for the death of his or her
parent. The term spouse, even though not defined in the statute, is implied to refer
only to a person legally married. That would mean that only heterosexual surviving
spouses would be entitled to bring a cause of action.
The adverse effects on the child of the same-sex relationship are over-
whelming. The child of this relationship will have to suffer the loss and the finan-
cial strain of losing a parent. With the possible legalization of same-sex marriage in
Hawaii and Vermont, this unequal treatment the child receives could be negated.
D. Employer (Fringe) Benefits
Another area of the law that deprives the children of same-sex marriage
benefits that children of heterosexual marriages receive deals with employee bene-
fits for federal workers. When a public safety officer has died in the line of duty,
the Bureau of Justice Assistance will pay $100,000 to the surviving family.204 The
only problem is that the surviving family does not include the survivor of a same-
sex relationship or the non-biological child of the deceased.
The Federal Government is not the only employer that denies benefits to
same-sex partners. A 1992 case in Wisconsin made it painfully clear that without
the legal recognition of spouse status, same-sex couples would not be given insur-
ance coverage like their heterosexual married counterparts. 205 In Phillips v. Wiscon-
sin Personnel Commission,206 the court held that insurance coverage for state em-
ployees could be limited to spouses and children.0 7 The court reasoned that the rule
by the Commission did not only affect those in homosexual relationships; it af-
fected unmarried heterosexual relationships as well.208 What the court failed to take
into account was the fact that those heterosexual unmarried couples could get mar-
ried, something the homosexual couples could not do. The children of those unmar-
ried couples will suffer like the children of same-sex relationships. But, the unmar-
ried parents could get married just to help the child. That is a delicacy the same-sex
couple does not have.
By limiting the insurance coverage to spouses and children, the court did
not contemplate the effect the decision could have on the children of the same-sex
relationships. If the person that can be insured through employment is not the bio-
logical parent of the child, then the child cannot be covered.
Similarly, a 1997 New Jersey case, Rutgers Council ofAA UP Chapters v.
204 42 U.S.C. § 3796 (1994).
205 See Phillips v. Wisconsin Personnel Comm'n, 482 N.W.2d 121 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992).
206 Id.
207 Id. The plaintiff, Jeri-Lynn Phillips, filed a complaint that the denial of her application for family
health insurance was employment discrimination. The court rejected her argument that the determination
discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation and marital status.
208 See id. at 127.
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Rutgers, The State University,20 9 denied health benefits to same-sex partners of
employees. In that case the court discussed the denial as not being violative of the
New Jersey Constitution. Nowhere in the opinion did the court mention the nega-
tive impact the decision would have on the children of same-sex unions.
The court, instead of looking at the decision as granting a benefit to a
same-sex couple, should have viewed the benefit as improving the life of the child
or children of that relationship. By legalizing same-sex marriage, the statues that
use the word "spouse" would apply to those same-sex couples that choose to marry.
The legalization of same-sex marriage will do away with all the problems that are
associated with the interpretation of statutes. It will allow same-sex couples to le-
galize their relationships and provide for their children. The benefits that children
of married heterosexual couples receive are desired by the children of same-sex
couples.
Another case dealing with employee benefits, Ross v. Denver Department
of Health and Hospitals,210 was decided against the granting of benefits to the les-
bian plaintiff. The Colorado Court of Appeals held that the denial of leave of ab-
sence so that the plaintiff could take care of her lesbian partner did not violate the
Career Service Authority Rules.211 The court discussed how the denial of the leave
of absence was not only prohibited for same-sex couples, but for unmarried hetero-
sexual couples, too.212 What the court failed to recognize was that heterosexual
couples have the option of whether or not to marry. The homosexual couple does
not have that option.
By denying the sick leave for the plaintiff the court in essence is saying
that the plaintiff must find someone else to care for her partner. This denial threat-
ens the job security of the homosexual employee. If she cannot afford to pay for
someone to take care of her partner, then she must leave her job and hope that she
will not be fired. If, on the other hand, she is able to muster up enough money to
hire someone to care for her ailing partner, then the family has lost valuable dollars
on something that a married couple would not have to worry about. Ultimately, by
forcing the homosexual couple to hire someone, the child of the relationship is de-
prived the money that is spent on the care. If the court would have read into the
statute or, alternatively, if same-sex marriages were legalized, then the problem
would no longer exist. If either were to happen, then the homosexual employee
209 689 A.2d 828 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997). The employees of Rutgers University filed suit
against the university for the denial of health benefits for domestic partners of same-sex relationships. The
suit was initiated by individual professors as well as the union (Rutgers Council of AAUP Chapters).
210 883 P.2d 516 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994). The plaintiff, Mary K. Ross, brought suit alleging discrimina-
tion based on sexual orientation because her employer, the Department of Health and Hospitals, refused to
grant her sick leave to care for her lesbian partner.
211 According to the court, the Rules provide "in part that sick leave may be used ... for necessary
care and attendance during sickness... of a member of the employee's immediate family." Id. at 518. The
court went on to cite the definition of family as it appears in the statute. The court stated that immediate
family is defined as "husband, wife, son, daughter, mother, father, grandmother, grandfather, brother, sister,
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would not have to take needed dollars away from her child to take care of her ailing
partner.
In Hinman v. Department of Personnel Administration,213 the court held
that the denial of dental benefit coverage to homosexual partners of state employees
does not constitute discrimination.214 The court reasoned that thie homosexual part-
ners were not being discriminated against because they were homosexuals. 215 They
were similarly situated to unmarried heterosexual state employees.216 The court
reasoned that the distinction drawn was favoring the public policy of promoting
217marriage.
What the numerous courts seein to have overlooked is that heterosexual
unmarried couples are not similarly situated with same-sex couples. A recurring
theme in these cases is that the court puts the two groups on the same playing field
without looking at the possibilities. Heterosexuals can get married; homosexuals
cannot. It is impossible to put the two categories of people on the same level. Un-
married heterosexual couples choose not to get married. Homosexual couples do
not even have the choice.
The federal government, by statute, 18 has a ban on discrimination in fed-
eral employment based on marital status.21 9 This statute does not protect homosex-
ual employees because same-sex couples cannot legally marry. The children of
married and unmarried heterosexual relationships are protected by this statute.
Those children will not have to worry about their parents being fired because they
are or are not married. On the other hand, homosexual couples will not have the
benefit of using the marital status discrimination ban to ensure that one or both of
them are not fired for no other reason then bias. The statute does not cover sexual
orientation. If same-sex marriages were legalized, then the ban would apply to mar-
ried homosexual couples. This would guarantee a fair working environment for all
alike. The child, once his parents are legally permitted to marry, will not suffer
from the loss of money because his parent is fired due to the parent's marital status.
The child will profit from the marital status discrimination ban because his parents
will at least be married or will be protected even if they choose not to marry. Until
same-sex marriages are recognized, the marital status discrimination ban will not
apply to homosexual couples.
Another area of the law that denies the children of same-sex unions bene-
213 167 Cal. App. 3d 516 (1985).
214 See id. at 520.
215 See id. at 524.
216 See id.
217 See id. at 529.
218 See 5 U.S.C. § 7204 (1994).
219 See 5 U.S.C. § 7202 (1994) (explaining that the employee can either be female or male and that
the spouse, being of the opposite sex, is entitled to the benefits (along with the employee's children)).
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fits is the military. The military's policy on homosexuality220 is referred to as
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell." The policy disables a member of the armed services from
disclosing his or her homosexuality. By hiding, the service member is unable to
apply for benefits for his partner as a spouse or his non-biological child as a de-
pendent.221 One of the benefits conferred on the dependents of service members is a
cost of living allowance in the continental United States. - Another benefit given
to the family of a service member is death benefits.223 If a member of the armed
forces dies and is covered, there is a hierarchy of beneficiaries who will receive the
death gratuity. Nowhere in the statute does it mention a same-sex domestic partner
or the child of that relationship. The statute does mention children, but if the child
of the relationship is not the biological or adopted child of the decedent' 24 then the
child will not be eligible to receive the payment.225 A similar benefit given to mar-
ried couples in which one of the spouses is a member of the uniformed services
deals with travel and transportation expenses. 26 The statute gives the "dependents
of the service member cost of transportation or a monetary allowance if the mem-
ber is ordered to make a change in permanent station., 227 This allowance, according
to the definition of dependent, would not apply to the non-biological child of the
uniformed member's same-sex partner.
There are also employment opportunities for the spouses of members of
the armed forces. The statute gives "preference to qualified spouses in hiring for
any civilian position in the Department of Defense if the spouse is among persons
determined to be [the] best qualified for the position."228 The spouse of the service
member will be given special treatment in job hiring. This, in turn, enables the fam-
ily to bring in more income to take care of the children. The same-sex partner,
however, will not be given preferential treatment and will have to work twice as
220 See 10 U.S.C. § 654 (1994). See, e.g., Able v. U.S., 88 F.3d 1280 (2d. Cir. 1996) (policy held to be
constitutional).
221 37 U.S.C. § 401 (a) (1994) (defines a dependent as a spouse, child, parent, stepchild or other
unmarried dependent person placed in the custody of the service member by a court of competent jurisdic-
tion).
222 37 U.S.C. § 403a allows money to be paid to the dependents of a member of the armed forces if
that member is assigned to duty in the continental United States and the dependent(s) lives in a high cost area.
The statute defines a high cost area as a place in which "the cost of living exceeds the average cost of living
in the continental United States." 37 U.S.C. § 403a(c)(4).
223 See 10 U.S.C. § 1477 (1994).
224 See id. The statute also applies to a stepchild, but in order to become a stepchild , the biological
parent and the new spouse must be legally married.
225 See 10 U.S.C. § 1477(b). The statute does include a hierarchy of "persons in loco parentis" of the
deceased service member, but it makes no such distinction for non-legal children to whom the service mem-
ber may have been in loco parentis. See id. at § 1477(c).
226 See 37 U.S.C. § 406 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
227 Id.
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hard to get a job and supplement the income. The money that could have been
made if the same-sex partner was given preferential treatment for the job ultimately
deprives the child of money. More time may be spent by the non-service member to
find a job. Similarly the homosexual parent, even if qualified, will not get special
treatment as the spouse of a member of the armed forces.
This statute does take into account non-biological and non-adopted chil-
dren of the relationship. But, the simple fact is that marital status indirectly affects
the eligibility of the recipient of the benefit. The child, because his parents cannot
get married, is unable to receive the benefits. The denial of the gratuity to the child
because he is not a stepchild of the deceased is a direct link to marital status. Once
again, the child of a same-sex partnership is forced to suffer, while the child of a
legal marriage is not.
If same-sex marriages were legalized, the military policy banning homo-
sexuals would have to be updated. If a same-sex partner were considered the legal
spouse of a member of the armed forces, the denial of benefits to the spouse would
be discrimination based on marital status. Furthermore, the biological child of the
non-service member, if same-sex marriages were legalized, would be able to bene-
fit from the luxuries the military confers on its members.
E. Other Benefits
The designation of parent and child entitles the "family" to use of the judi-
cial system for certain purposes that can directly benefit a child upon dissolution of
the family unit: child support, custody and visitation. Absent legal recognition of
the parent-child relationship, standing is absent, and the two are legal strangers who
have no right to enforce support obligations or seek custody or visitation.
The obligation to pay child support is inherently a duty reserved to legal
parents (or stepparents). Most statutes are specific on this point and do not extend
the obligation beyond a parent or legal guardian.229 If one of the "parents" is legally
a stranger to the child, that parent, upon dissolution of the family unit, will have no
concomitant obligation to provide child support. This has the effect of removing
from the child the very source of funds that may have supported the child for a
considerable period of time, especially if the "non-biological" parent was the pri-
mary wage earner in the household.230
Seeking custody or visitation is always a situation fraught with peril for a
229 For instance, New York places the obligation to pay support on the "parent" of a child under 21.
N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT § 413 (1962). The same statute extends that obligation to a legal stepparent on a public
charge basis only. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 415.
230 If the non-biological parent was also the primary property owner, dissolution of the relationship
may deprive the parent and child of property division, including equitable or equal distribution, or community
property division. Statutory attempts to grant domestic partner benefits, such as Hawaii's Reciprocal Benefi-
ciaries Act, HAW. REv. STAT. § 572C (Supp. 1998), fail to provide relief. See W. Brian Burnette, Note,
Hawaii's Reciprocal Beneficiaries Act: An Effective Step in Resolving the Controversy Surrounding Same-
Sex Marriage, 37 BRANDEIS L.J. 81, 93 (1998-99).
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gay or lesbian parent,231 even if the biological tie is undisputed.2
32 Where, as in
many families with same-sex adults, one is a biological and legal stranger to the
child, the situation becomes even worse. The child, who may recognize the
"stranger" as a parent, is not entitled to visitation with that parent or to have the
parent seek custody, since these are matters generally reserved only for biological
parents. The "second parent" has had to resort to other theories to define their
status, including equitable parent status, equitable estoppel, in loco parentis, and de
facto parent.23
A recent decision by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts used
just such a theory in affirming an order of temporary visitation with the now es-
tranged lesbian partner of the biological parent.234 The court stated:
The recognition of de facto parents is in accord with notions of
the modem family. An increasing number of same gender couples,
like the plaintiff and the defendant, are deciding to have children.
It is to be expected that children of nontraditional families, like
other children, form relationships with both parents, whether those
parents are legal or de facto. See Adoption of Tammy. See also J.
GOLDSTEIN ET AL., THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 12-13
(1996). Thus, the best interests must include an examination of the
child's relationship with both his legal and de facto parent.235
There are other tangible economic benefits for families, such as family
231 For a comprehensive discussion of these perils, including an analysis of the per se and nexus rules,
see Julie Shapiro, Custody and Conduct: How the Law Pails Lesbian and Gay Parents and Their Children, 71
IND. L.J. 623 (1996).
232 It is a fact of life that lesbian and gay parents face judicial scrutiny more rigorous than heterosex-
ual parents. See Susan J. Becker, supra note 99, at 94. Professor Becker goes on to note that empirical data
demonstrates that many common negative assumptions regarding gay and lesbian parents are simply false.
See id.; see also Karen Markey, Note, An Overview of the Legal Challenges Faced by Gay and Lesbian
Parents: How Courts Treat the Growing Number of Gay Families, 14 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 721, 722
(1998); Kathryn Kendell, The Custody Challenge: Debunking Myths About Lesbian and Gay Parents and
Their Children, 20 FAM. ADVOC. 21 (1997). For a further compilation of research on the issue of psychologi-
cal harm caused to children of gay or lesbian parents, see D'Amato, supra note 64, at 933 n.141.
233 See Elizabeth A. Delaney, Statutory Protection of the Other Mother: Legally Recognizing the
Relationship Between the Nonbiological Lesbian Parent and Her Child, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 177, 187 (1991);
Markey, supra note 232, at 751.
234 See E.N.O. v. L.M.N., 711 N.E.2d 886 (Mass. 1999). See supra note 207; see also V.C. v. M.J.B.,
748 A.2d 539 (N.J. 2000).
235 Id. at 891. (citation omitted). It should be noted that the couple had executed a co-parenting
agreement that provided for parental status even if the parties were to separate. In the landmark book Beyond
the Best Interests of the Child, the authors argued that the role of "psychological parent" transcends biology
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memberships to museums and health clubs, frequent flier awards,236 discounted
family travel, and home and health insurance.23 7 Family members also have the
right to make certain decisions with regard to medical emergencies and guardian-
ship.23
V. BAKER V. VERMONT
Where the State of Hawaii ultimately dared not tread, the Vermont Su-
preme Court chose to place its footprint on the possible evolution of the definition
of marriage. In Baker v. Vermont,239 decided solely on state constitutional grounds,
the court unanimously found the denial of marital benefits to same-sex couples to
be a violation of the Vermont Constitution's Common Benefits Clause240 and di-
rected the legislature to craft an appropriate means of effecting its mandate. The
opinion, perhaps much more so than the original ruling in Baehr v. Lewin,241 ad-
dresses not only the legal benefits of marriage, but also the role of marriage within
a contemporary family structure.
Plaintiffs, three same-sex couples, sought marriage licenses from their
various town clerks and were refused as ineligible under state marriage laws.242 The
trial court dismissed the complaint, and an appeal was taken to the Vermont Su-
preme Court.243 It should be noted that two of the couples have raised children to-
gether.2"
The court was careful to distinguish its analysis from federal equal protec-
tion jurisprudence. 24 Noting that Vermont's Common Benefits Clause preceded by
nearly a century the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, the
236 Many frequent flyer awards now allow for companion travel; others may be transferred regardless
of relationship. See Ettelbrick, supra note 47, at 127.
237 See id.
238 See Chase, supra note 161, at 365-66; see also In re Guardianship of Kowalski, 382 N.W.2d 861
(Minn. CL App 1986), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1085 (1986); 392 N.W.2d 310 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); 478
N.W.2d 790 (Minn. CL App. 1991). A seven-year dispute pitted Sharon Kowlaski's father against her lesbian
partner, Karen Thompson, for guardianship after Kowalski was severely injured in an automobile accident.
Although Thompson was ultimately successful, the seven-year legal battle was occasioned because of Minne-
sota's refusal to accept the relationship of the two women as a legal marriage, leaving Thompson as a legal
stranger. The same could happen to the child of a same-sex couple if one of the parents is, technically, a legal
stranger.
239 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
240 VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 7.
241 See supra note 1.
242 See Baker, 744. A.2d at 867.
243 See id. at 868.
244 See id. at 867.
245 See id. at 870.
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court found the purpose of the Common Benefits Clause to be "the elimination of
artificial governmental preferments and advantages. ' This concept requires the
court to look at the result of the discrimination and whether there are valid public
interests promoted, rather than identifying the discrimination through a definition
of the subject class itself. A result-oriented analysis requires a high threshold of
proof to justify discrimination by denying benefits to a particular group or class of
individuals.
The State proffered as the principal reason for denying the legal benefits of
marriage to same-sex couples the government's interest in the link between pro-
creation and child rearing.247 The State sought to use the marriage statutes to define
the interrelationship between procreation and child rearing, something it alleged
was not possible in same-sex couples who could not conceive a child on their
own.248 The court effectively demolished this purported link by recognizing the
legitimate interest of the state "in promoting a permanent commitment between
couples for the security of their children."249 By changing the subject of the role
from married husbands and wives to "couples," and the object from parents to chil-
dren, the court recognized that families are created in many different ways. Protec-
tion of children, a central theme and purpose of the role of family, cannot justify
discrimination simply because of the marital status (or even gender) of the par-
ents.
250
The court noted that procreation is not an all-inclusive reason for marriage:
It is equally undisputed that many opposite-sex couples marry
for reasons unrelated to procreation, that some of these couples
never intend to have children, and that others are incapable of hav-
ing children. Therefore, if the purpose of the statutory exclusion of
same-sex couples is to "further[ ] the link between procreation and
child rearing," it is significantly underinclusive. The law extends
the benefits and protections of marriage to many persons with no
logical connection to the stated governmental goal.
251
The court went on to note that same-sex parenting was not only a reality
but had been affirmatively sanctioned by the Vermont Legislature, which not only
246 Id. at 876.
247 See Baker, 744 A.2d at 881.
248 See id.
249 Id.
250 See id. at 882. The State offered several other justifications for denial of same-sex marriage,
including: providing both male and female role models in child rearing; minimizing legal problems of surro-
gacy contracts and sperm donors; discouraging marriages of convenience to take advantage of legal benefits;
and maintaining uniformity with marriage laws of other states. The court made short work of these argu-
ments, noting that existing Vermont law, for the most part, compelled conclusions other than those the State
offered. See id. at 884-85.
251 Baker, 744 A.2d at 881 (alteration in original).
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removed barriers to same-sex adoption and assisted conception but provided for the
security of the subject children upon the dissolution of the domestic relationship.252
Any attempt of the marriage statute to legitimize children, therefore, exposes chil-
dren of same-sex couples "to the precise risks that the State argues the marriage
laws are designed to secure against. In short, the marital exclusion treats persons
who are similarly situated for purposes of the law, differently. '25 If the "persons"
are defined as the children of two parents, then indeed the inability of their parents
to marry is subjecting children of same-sex couples to denial of benefits and legal
discrimination because of a status beyond their control.
The benefits of marriage were not lost on the court. In reference to Loving
v. Virginia254 the Baker court noted: "[A]ccess to a civil marriage license and the
multitude of legal benefits, protections, and obligations that flow from it signifi-
cantly enhance the quality of life in our society.... [T]he marriage laws transform
a private agreement into a source of significant public benefits and protections."'2
The court provided an extensive list of legal benefits of marriage provided by vari-
ous Vermont statutes and cited other collections mentioned previously in this arti-
cle and elsewhere.2 Tying the legal benefits of marriage to the state's proffered
link between procreation and child rearing as a justification for marital discrimina-
tion, the court stated:
While other statutes could be added to this list, the point is clear.
The legal benefits and protections flowing from a marriage license
are of such significance that any statutory exclusion must neces-
sarily be grounded on public concerns of sufficient weight, co-
gency, and authority that the justice of the deprivation cannot seri-
ously be questioned. Considered in light of the extreme logical
disjunction between the classification and the stated purposes of
the law - protecting children and "furthering the link between
procreation and child rearing" - the exclusion falls substantially
short of this standard. The laudable governmental goal of promot-
ing a commitment between married couples to promote the secu-
rity of their children and the community as a whole provides no
reasonable basis for denying the legal benefits and protections of
marriage to same-sex couples, who are no differently situated with
respect to this goal than their opposite-sex counterparts. Promot-
ing a link between procreation and childrearing similarly fails to
252 See id. at 881-82.
253 Id. at 882.
254 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
255 Baker, 744 A.2d at 883.
256 See id at 883-84. The court referred to, among others, Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 59 (Haw.
1993), see supra note 1, and Chambers, supra note 173.
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support the exclusion.57
In fashioning a remedy, the court did not specifically direct that marriage
licenses be issued to same-sex couples. Rather, the court held only that plaintiffs
were entitled under the Common Benefits Clause of the Vermont Constitution "to
obtain the same benefits and protections afforded by Vermont law to married oppo-
site-sex couples., 2 8 The court noted that its decision granted to same-sex couples
the benefits of marriage, but not necessarily the status of marriage itself, deferring
to the legislature to determine whether to allow same-sex marriage per se or some
form of domestic partnership licensing scheme.259 Such a holding was not inconsis-
tent with the fundamental basis of its benefits-related analysis, although a spirited
partial dissent chastised the court for not directly authorizing the marital status
sought by the plaintiffs.
In its conclusion the court went beyond the narrow confines of the defini-
tion of marriage to recognize that commitment requires no such labeling:
While many have noted the symbolic or spiritual significance of
the marital relation, it is plaintiffs' claim to the secular benefits
and protections of a singularly human relationship that, in our
view, characterizes this case. The State's interest in extending of-
ficial recognition and legal protection to the professed commit-
ment of two individuals to a lasting relationship of mutual affec-
tion is predicated on the belief that legal support of a couple's
commitment provides stability for the individuals, their family,
and the broader community. Although plaintiffs' interest in seek-
ing state recognition and protection of their mutual commitment
may - in view of divorce statistics - represent "the triumph of
hope over experience," the essential aspect of their claim is simply
and fundamentally for inclusion in the family of State-sanctioned
human relations.261
The court specifically retained jurisdiction to permit the legislature to enact a rem-
edy consistent with the constitutional mandate.262
Baker resolves little and raises many additional questions. In effect, the
court granted the plaintiffs no relief, specifically declining to direct the issuance of
257 Baker, 744 A.2d at 884.
258 Id. at 886.
259 See id.
260 See id. at 898 (Johnson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
261 Id. at 888-89 (footnote omitted).
262 See Baker, 744 A.2d at 889.
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the marriage licenses plaintiffs had sought.26 The court actually provided nothing
other than hope and the expectation that the Vermont Legislature would timely
provide a more specific remedy.
The opinion, however, poises Vermont on the threshold of a new era in de-
fining marriage and family by function and content rather than label. In concluding
that the state could not deny benefits simply because of marital status, the court
recognized that family encompasses more than husband, wife and children, and that
other permutations not only existed but were entitled to constitutional protection.
Finally, the court recognized that children receive or are denied benefits because of
their parents' marital status, yet this status has no relation to the purpose of the
benefit or the state justification for selectivity. While the decision does not, ulti-
mately, rest on the rights of the children, it does recognize the effects on the chil-
dren of the parents' ability to marry and the inappropriate discrimination against
the child when a same-sex couple is denied this right.
The Vermont Supreme Court may yet have to revisit this matter to deter-
mine whether the legislative response satisfies the judicial mandate. 264 Yet the pos-
sibility exists that same-sex couples and their children will be entitled at least to
equal benefits, and perhaps to marriage itself, in the foreseeable future. Even more
encouraging, the court recognized the special status of the children of a same-sex
relationship. The benefits-oriented approach of the Vermont Supreme Court offers
some hope of a new, child-oriented analysis and redefinition of marriage based on a
more functional definition of family and the benefits flowing from the legally rec-
ognized marital relationship.
VI. DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIPS AND CIVIL UNIONS
Gay men and lesbians who find themselves in long-term, committed rela-
tionships have sought to establish domestic partnerships. The public benefit of mar-
riage is important to same-sex couples seeking social acceptance of their relation-
ships, so they choose domestic partnerships as the only comparable option avail-
able to them.265 Over the past two decades, this new legal structure has come to be
offered in dozens of municipalities in the United States and Canada.266 (Some states
263 See id. at 886.
264 For the legislative response, see infra Part VI, especially the text accompanying notes 272 and
273.
265 See Adrienne K. Wilson, Same-Sex Marriage: A Review, 17 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 539, 543
(1991).
266 See Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d. 106 (Cal. 1976). The San Francisco Domestic Partnership Ordi-
nance, SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., ADMIN. CODE ch. 62 (1991) states that:
The purpose of this ordinance is to create a way to recognize intimate committed re-
lationships, including those of lesbians and gay men who otherwise are denied the right
to identify the partners with whom they share their lives.... Domestic Partners are two
adults who have chosen to share one another's lives in an intimate and committed rela-
tionship of mutual caring, who live together, and who have agreed to be jointly respon-
sible for basic living expenses incurred during the Domestic Partnership.
1999]
43
Silverman: Suffer the Little Children: Justifying Same-Sex Marriage from the
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1999
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
have gone even further and created a form of common-law marriage applicable
only at death, but it is doubtful if same-sex survivors would qualify for the bene-
fits.)
267
The goal of a domestic partnership should be to promote personal fulfill-
ment and social productivity, as well as to assure the parties that their rights and
expectations will be protected. Domestic partnership legislation should: (1) pro-
mote personal choice within stable intimate relations; (2) assist the parties in defin-
ing their relationship, thus making them better aware of their rights and obligations;
and (3) assist the courts, when necessary, to define relationships and equitably re-
solve disputes between the parties and with third parties.268
An example of this kind of legislation is Hawaii's Reciprocal Beneficiaries
Act.269 This Act was adopted to prevent judicial recognition of same-sex marriages.
The rights include family health care benefits for state employees, hospital visita-
tion rights, property and inheritance rights, the right to sue for wrongful death, and
the right to protection from domestic violence of a partner. But the Act does not
provide marital title to same-sex couples and does not provide the same level of
equality to gay and lesbian couples that would be granted automatically upon le-
galization of same-sex marriage. 270 The Act even states as one of its purposes the
preservation of the "unique social institution" of heterosexual marriage. 271
Vermont appears ready to go further. Its legislative response to the judicial
mandate in Baker v. Vermont2 72 creates a new form of legally sanctioned relation-
ship: the civil union. In essence, the state is creating an entity that is parallel to
marriage, granting to same-sex couples virtually all of the legal benefits, protec-
tions and responsibilities of marriage, but not the title. This establishment of a civil
union will require not only an official license, but also a certification, a form of
solemnization. Upon certification, the same-sex couple will become subject to all
of the state's laws, rules and regulations relating to a married couple. The statute
explicitly equates dissolution of a civil union to the same procedures, rights and
267 See Mary Louise Fellows, Committed Partners and Inheritance: An Empirical Study, 16 LAW &
INEQ. 1 (1998); see also N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:39 (1992) ("Persons cohabiting and acknowledging
each other as husband and wife, and generally reputed to be such, for a period of 3 years, and until the de-
cease of one of them, shall thereafter be deemed to have legally married."); OR. REV. STAT. § 112.017 (1997)
(proposing that a person is considered a surviving spouse if circumstances, including cohabitation for 10
years, are met).
268 See Craig A. Bowman and Blake M. Comish, Note, A More Perfect Union: A Legal and Social
Analysis of Domestic Partnership Ordinances, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1164, 1187 (1992). Providing for personal
choice within domestic relations will promote family stability by allowing individuals to choose relationships
that are suitable for them. In addition, domestic partnerships currently provide the only option for legal rec-
ognition of same-sex relationships.
269 See HAW. REV. STAT. § 572C (Supp. 1997).
270 See Bumette, supra note 230, at 87.
271 See HAW. REV. STAT. § 572C-2 (Supp. 1998); Bumette, supra note 230, at 88.
272 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
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obligations as are involved in a civil marriage dissolution.
Where Hawaii's Reciprocal Beneficiaries Act essentially extends certain
specifically enumerated rights and benefits to privately contracted domestic part-
nerships, Vermont officially creates a new form of relationship, requiring official
licensing and certification. Although the statute lists many of the benefits to be
extended to civil unions, it also states that a civil union shall receive all the benefits
of marriage. It appears, at least under Vermont law, that the only difference be-
tween a marriage and a civil union are the name and the gender composition of the
couple.2 4
Not all domestic partner benefits are provided by municipalities or other
government entities. The business world and the non-profit sector are increasingly
providing recognition and benefits to domestic partners. 275 A recent survey indi-
cates that one in four U.S. companies with over 5,000 employees offer domestic
partnership benefits, and 13 percent of all U.S. employers offer such benefits. 6
Further, domestic partnership agreements serve as a form of contractual
marriage between the two principals.277 While some of their arrangements may lack
official state sanction, many of the provisions provide, in contract terms, an effec-
273 See 2000 Vt. Acts & Resolves 91. The Act also provides more limited reciprocal beneficiaries
relationships for people related by blood or adoption and prevented from establishing a civil union or mar-
riage.
274 Intriguing issues are raised about the effect of civil unions beyond Vermont's borders. The statute
appears to allow non-residents to certify civil unions in the state. Will another state honor the rights, privi-
leges and obligations created by the Civil Union Act when a Vermont couple moves to another state, invok-
ing the Full Faith and Credit Clause? Will another state honor a Vermont civil union and grant its own citi-
zens benefits under the domiciliary state's statutes? I leave these and other interstate recognition issues to
another forum.
275 "Domestic partnership benefits are becoming common not only in the business world, but also in
the non-profit sector, most notable in colleges and universities. Some institutions even offer benefits to stu-
dents, allowing same-sex partners to reside in married student housing and extending health insurance bene-
fits to partners of gay and lesbian students." Caroline J. Lindberg, Note, Lisa Grant v. South-West Trains:
The Limited Utility of Sex Discrimination Arguments in Securing Lesbian and Gay Rights, 12 TEMP. INT'L &
COMp. L.J. 403 (1998). See Marsh King, UWRegents Allow Benefits for Same-Sex Partners, SEATrLETIMES,
May 17, 1997, atAl.
276 See John Hendren, A Values Judgment: Disney Not Alone in Seeing Economic Benefits from
Providing Domestic Partner Benefits (KPMG Peat Marwick Survey), PIrSBURGH PosT-GAZETrE, June 24,
1997, at B1.
277 Interestingly, one of the first cases to enforce a private agreement involved a heterosexual couple.
See Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976). The parties lived together for seven years without marrying.
The court held that express contracts between non-marital partners should be upheld unless the contract was
based on "meretricious sexual services" as its consideration. In the absence of an express contract, the courts
should look to the conduct of the parties to determine if an implied contract exists. The court may also em-
ploy the doctrine of quantum meruit or equitable remedies when warranted. See id. at 110.
Two points about Marvin should be noted. First, one wonders whether courts will be quicker to
find that domestic partnership agreements between homosexuals are based on "meretricious sexual services"
as consideration. See, e.g., Whorton v. Dillingham III, 202 Cal. App. 3d 447 (1988). Although the services to
be provided included chauffeur, bodyguard, social and business secretary, partner and counselor in real estate,
because Whorton was also constant companion and lover the court gave unusually careful scrutiny to the
contract, ultimately finding it enforceable.
Secondly, one could suggest that even the civil marital contract is based, in some part, on sexual
services. But that is a point for another article on another day.
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tive substitute for the legal benefits granted only to married couples.278 With these
types of agreements, couples may approach the appearance, legally, of a married
couple,279 although, in the end, they still fall far short.280 Simply stated, they fail to
create a bona fide legally recognized family relationship.281 The issue is also raised
that courts may be more reluctant to enforce domestic partnership agreements, es-
pecially between partners of the same gender, than to enforce the rights and respon-
sibilities within the state-sanctioned marriage contract.282
Some have suggested that civil union or domestic partnership legislation
will serve as an effective substitute for the right of lesbians and gays to marry. But
the benefits conferred do not equal all of the statutory rights of the married cou-
ple,283 and those municipalities adopting such programs have little power to extend
the benefits beyond its own employees. 28 4 Thomas Hixson argues that the growth of
recognition by private employers of gay and lesbian families is preferable to the
public approach;285 he reasons that the public approach grants benefits regardless of
marriage, while the private approach offers only to gays and lesbians a substitute
for the marriage they may not legally contract.2a On the other hand, the different
278 See Chase, supra note 161; Jane A. Marquardt, A Will-Not a Wish-Makes It So, 20 FAM.
ADVOC. 35 (1997).
279 The partnerships include responsibilities of support, commitment and obligation within the eco-
nomic partnership construct of emerging family law. See Raymond C. O'Brien, Domestic Partnership: Rec-
ognition and Responsibility, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 163 (1995).
280 "By no fair reckoning could it be said that any alternative status or combination of legal strategies
now available or contemplated in the future would bring to gay families the 'image' or 'likeness' of the
bundle of rights and obligations that flow from legal marriage." Christensen, supra note 45, at 1782.
281 See Gwendolyn L. Snodgrass, Note, Creating Family Without Marriage: The Advantages and
Disadvantages of Adult Adoption Among Gay and Lesbian Partners, 36 BRANDEIS J. FAM. L. 75, 76. (1997-
98).
282 See supra note 277. See, e.g., Posik v. Layton, 695 So. 2d 759, 767 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)
("The State is not condoning the lifestyles of homosexuals or married live-ins; it is merely recognizing their
constitutional private property and contract rights.").
283 "Because most of marriage's legal consequences are the product of statutory invention, it ought to
be a relatively simple matter to replicate them in an altemative legal status devised for same-sex couples-if,
that is, the political will existed to do so. The problem for simulacrum advocates, of course, is that there is no
such will." Christensen, supra note 45, at 1734.
284 A recent attempt by the City of Boston to extend group health benefits ran afoul of a state statute
which specifically defined dependents as: "an employee's spouse, an employee's unmarried children under
nineteen years of age, and any child nineteen years of age or over who is mentally or physically incapable of
earning his own living.... Said definition shall also include an unmarried child nineteen years of age or over
who is a full-time student in an educational or vocational institution and whose program of education has not
been substantially interrupted by full-time gainful employment excluding service in the armed services."
Connors v. City of Boston, 714 N.E.2d 335 (Mass. 1999) (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 32B (West
1989)).
285 A curious byproduct of this analysis is that benefits granted to same-sex domestic partners are
sometimes denied to heterosexual unmarried partners. See Foray v. Bell Atlantic, 56 F. Supp. 2d 327
(S.D.N.Y. 1999). The court found a distinction in the ability of the heterosexual couple to marry, a right
legally denied to same-sex couples.
286 See Hixson, supra note 20, at 501.
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approaches - public vs. private - may reflect alternative growing recognition by the
public for gay and lesbian family entities.287
Interestingly, the very growth of domestic partnership legislation and the
granting of benefits, whether public or private, may have another effect: an ac-
knowledgment that individuals in this type of arrangement are entitled to these
benefits. 28 If they are, then perhaps we should redefine our societal expectation of
who is entitled to benefits, substituting a family-function model for the current
marriage-legal family form. On the other hand, to support domestic partnerships for
same-sex couples expresses support for the same type of long-term commitment we
associate with marriage. To extend marriage to homosexuals would, under these
circumstances, broaden, rather than dilute, society's support for marriage as a long-
term interpersonal relationship.289 Perhaps then we can support the concept of
same-sex marriage without adversely affecting our conception of the commitment
required between the parties and the nature of the marital relationship.
VII. CONCLUSION
The most obvious fact of same-sex relationships is that the children have
no control over the adults' ability or inability to marry. Yet the fact of marital status
controls many of the rights and benefits accruing to the child, including the most
fundamental right of all, to be included as part of a "family." 290 Children should not
bear the burden of this type of legal discrimination against same-sex couples.2 91
The state's compelling interest in providing a stable home for the raising of chil-
dren is a reason to allow, rather than prohibit, same-sex marriages. 292 This paper
has demonstrated, hopefully persuasively, that the detriment to children of same-
sex couples is pervasive.293
287 See Christensen, supra note 47, at 1305.
288 See Jax, supra note 65, at 490-91. This was the specific ruling of the Vermont Supreme Court in
Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999). See supra note 2 and Part V. The court deferred to the legisla-
ture, however, on the form: same-sex marriage or some form of domestic partnership.
289 See Macedo, supra note 53, at 289.
29o "Legislation is measured for consistency with the Constitution by its impact on those whose con-
duct it affects ... The proper focus of constitutional inquiry is the group for whom the law is a restriction, not
the group for whom the law is irrelevant." Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 894 (1992). Certainly, the parents are not benign to the effects of statutes and cases which deny
same-sex marriages, but by placing the primary emphasis on rights denied to the children because of the
marital status of the parents, the shift in emphasis should also enhance the constitutional limitation on the
states to enact such restrictions.
291 "I]nsofar as government controls the benefits and legal rights of family, function, not morality,
should govern family definitions and legal access to such benefits." Ettelbrick, supra note 47, at 132.
292 See Strasser, supra note 4, at 959.
293 While I have concentrated on tangible benefits denied to the children of same-sex couples, argu-
ments can be made that there are many intangible benefits which accrue to the children of a marriage, includ-
ing increased social capital, the elimination of stigmata regarding out-of-wedlock, or illegitimacy status, and
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If, as has been argued, marriage is a social construct, rather than a discov-
ery of society,2 4 we are capable of rebuilding the definition to encompass new
realities and new types of marital and family units.295 The Supreme Court declared
in Moore v. City of East Cleveland29 that the Constitution supports "a larger con-
ception of the family. '297 We should accept further that the right to marry, so fun-
damental to our society, can support a more expansive definition than that which is
limited to one man and one woman.
It is for these reasons that we must reevaluate our societal opposition to
same-sex marriage. While adults may have some freedom of choice, and have the
ability to provide for themselves, children of same-sex unions are denied benefits
for factors over which they and their parents have no control. The children are de-
nied rights and benefits granted to other children because of the marital status of
the parents.
For the first time, a state court has specifically recognized the adverse
status of children based on the marital status of the parents. Baker v. Vermon?98
represents the first wave of a new jurisprudence, where outdated definitions will be
replaced by more contemporary analysis recognizing the inherent rights not only of
the adults to a relationship but to the subject children as well. By examining the
opposition to same-sex marriages from the perspective of the children, perhaps
society will recognize a purpose and function to this new type of "alternate" family
and, in the new millennium, more readily accept the legal right of same-sex couples
to marry, if not for themselves, then for the sake of their children.
increased cognitive ability and educational achievement. See Vincent C. Green, Note, Same-Sex Adoption: An
Alternative Approach to Gay Marriage in New York, 62 BROOK. L. REv. 399, 426-27 (1996) (citing David
W. Murray, Poor Suffering Bastards: An Anthropologist Looks at Illegitimacy, POL'Y REV. 9 (1994)).
294 See Eskridge, supra note 57, at 1485.
295 Mohr argues that we have been redefining the function of marriage to remove gender distinctions
in the rights, obligations and duties of the marital unit. Having removed these distinctions from the content of
marriage, he suggests that the legal form of marriage can also be redefined to include same-sex couples. See
MOHR, supra note 58, at 37.
296 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
297 Id. at 505.
298 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
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